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INTRODUCTION
In 1999, Black's Law Dictionary seems to have erased a long-
recognized right of property owners. The revision went mostly unnoticed,
which is perhaps unsurprising given its placement on page 1130 of the
newly revised text. A comparison of the sixth and seventh editions' texts
illustrates the nature of the revision:
Owner. The person in whom is vested the ownership, dominion,
or title of property; proprietor. He who has dominion of a thing,
real or personal, corporeal or incorporeal, which he has a right to
enjoy and do with as he pleases, even to spoil or destroy it, as far as
the law permits, unless he be prevented by some agreement or
covenant which restrains his right.'
Owner. One who has the right to possess, use, and convey
something; a proprietor.2
The earlier definition had been remarkably stable, with virtually identical
definitions appearing in legal dictionaries from the mid-nineteenth century.3
And yet, as part of an extensive revision, the seventh edition's editors
decided to exclude what many would perceive to be the most extreme
feature of property ownership--the right to destroy.
This revision is in many ways surprising. As a matter of everyday
experience, the right to destroy one's own property seems firmly
entrenched. Rational people discard old clothes, furniture, albums, and
unsent letters every day. Most of this "junk" is worth little or nothing, so its
destruction proves entirely uncontroversial. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine
how a modem capitalist economy would function if owners were barred
from destroying obsolete refrigerators, unfashionable clothes, or rough
drafts of written work. Even in the context of valuable property, popular
sentiment seems to tolerate substantial property destruction. For example,
American cadavers are frequently buried wearing wedding rings, other
jewelry, and expensive clothing.4 And no one took seriously historic
1. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1105 (6th ed. 1990).
2. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1130 (7th ed. 1999).
3. E.g., BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1311 (3d ed. 1933); 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW
DICTIONARY 268 (12th ed. 1868); 2 JOHN BOUVIER, A LAW DICTIONARY 276 (5th ed. 1855); see
also Stein v. Burden, 24 Ala. 130, 132 (1854) (quoting an earlier Bouvier edition's definition of
ownership). The seventh edition of Black's Law Dictionary substantially revised many definitions.
For a rather critical but lighthearted review, see Eugene Kontorovich & David Lisitza, A to Zzz:
Once Opinionated and Charming, Black's Law Dictionary Is at Risk of Becoming Another
Webster's, LEGAL AFF., July/Aug. 2003, at 18.
4. See Lane DeGregory, 'Til Death Parts Us, ST. PETERSBURG (Fla.) TIMES, July 21, 2002, at
IF; A.J. Holly & Sons, What To Do Before the Funeral, http://www.hollyfuneralhome.com/
html/funeral before.html (last visited Dec. 10. 2004). Rochester Funeral Homes, Resource Guide:
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preservationists' protests when a Chicago restaurant chain spent $113,824
to purchase and destroy the infamous "cursed" baseball that Steve Bartman
deflected during game six of the 2003 National League Championship
Series.5
That said, Black's Law Dictionary's apparent abrogation of the right to
destroy is neither an accident nor an outlier. Indeed, the seventh edition's
implicit rejection of the right to destroy mostly tracks current trends in
American law. When asked to resolve cases where one party seeks to
destroy her property, courts have reacted with great hostility toward the
owner's destructive plans. Despite the existence of a norm that tolerates the
burial of wedding rings, courts might well refuse a decedent's humble
request to wear such jewelry for eternity.6 If a testator orders her executor
to destroy her home upon her death, the law probably will render the
executor unable to carry out her wishes. 7 And if a landlord requests the
city's permission to demolish a venerable but badly burned building that
has become an eyesore, a teetering hazard, and a financial burden, the
government can thwart her wishes.8 Confronted with arguably hard cases
and high stakes, many American courts have rejected the notion that an
owner has the right to destroy that which is hers, particularly in the
testamentary context.
This trend of substantially curtailing property owners' destruction
rights was given further momentum recently by two of the nation's most
capable property scholars. Joseph Sax's book Playing Darts with a
Rembrandt argues that American law is far too deferential to the wishes of
those who seek to destroy property that might have cultural significance. 9
Sax advocates depriving owners of the right to destroy works of art; literary
works; items of antiquity; correspondence with public officials; and newly
built, architecturally important buildings.' ° Indeed, the logic of Sax's
approach even seems applicable to famous, cursed baseballs. Similarly,
Edward McCaffery has argued that there is no place for a right to destroy or
waste one's own property in a modem economy,' 1 at one point referring to
Funeral Planning Checklist, http://www.rochesterfuneralhomes.com/ResourceGuides/
Funeral_Planning_Checklist.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2004).
5. See Monica Davey, Long-Suffering Cubs Fans Hope Blasted Ball Puts End to 'Curse,'
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2004, at A16 (noting the Chicago Historical Society's futile opposition to
the baseball's destruction).
6. See Meksras Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 371, 373 (C.P. Phila. County 1974).
7. See Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 217 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975).
8. See J.C. & Assocs. v. D.C. Bd. of Appeals & Review, 778 A.2d 296, 308-09 (D.C. 2001).
9. JOSEPH L. SAX, PLAYING DARTS WITH A REMBRANDT: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RIGHTS IN
CULTURAL TREASURES (1999). Sax's book does not discuss most of the cases analyzed in this
Article.
10. Id.
11. Edward J. McCaffery, Must We Have the Right To Waste?, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE
LEGAL AND POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 76 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001). McCaffery
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the right as "an embarrassment in Anglo-American law."'1 2 To McCaffery,
the only good reason for retaining the right to destroy is the rarity with
which owners intentionally destroy permanent assets.13
In advocating further substantial limitations on the owner's right to
destroy, Sax and McCaffery are not picking a fight with anyone in
particular. The right to destroy presently lacks a constituency within the
American legal academy. 14 This Article responds to Sax, McCaffery, and
the various judicial antidestruction rulings by presenting a qualified defense
of an owner's right to destroy valuable resources. 15 On my account,
empowering owners to destroy their property can promote important
expressive interests, spur creative activity, and enhance social welfare.
Moreover, a relatively laissez-faire attitude toward property destruction
avoids the enormous transaction costs that would be incurred in a Saxist
world. That is not to say that the right to destroy should be absolute. Indeed,
I will identify a few contexts and considerations in which restrictions on the
destruction of property are highly desirable.
The ambition of this Article, then, is to consider two questions:
(1) What interests are furthered by permitting an owner to destroy his
property? and (2) When should those interests give way to societal concerns
about wasted resources and negative externalities?
Part I of the Article sets forth the historical treatment of the right to
destroy and explores some conceptual difficulties inherent in any discussion
of property destruction. Under Roman law, the right to destroy or abuse-
the jus abutendi-served the important function of demarcating the
boundaries of an owner's rights in property. Under this conception,
destruction functioned as the most extreme recognized property right, so the
discusses the topic of property destruction as an abstract matter. Accordingly, he does not discuss
any of the cases herein.
12. Id. at 81.
13. Id. at 85-86; see also Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law: Round Table
Discussion, 64 WASH. U. L.Q. 793, 843 (1986) (transcribing Jack Carr's statements on the
infrequency with which valuable property is intentionally destroyed by its owner); infra note 32.
14. Cf McCaffery, supra note 11, at 81 ("The jus abutendi stands as an embarrassment in
Anglo-American law. Blackstone condemns it in moral terms; Honor& finesses it, because he sees
the right to waste as an inconsequential, perhaps difficult to remove, and in any event inevitable
ancillary of the important jus disponendi; and Epstein essentially follows suit-he sees no
problem of waste, because he denies the prevalence of it." (some italics omitted)).
15. By this I mean to limit my topic to instances where the sole fee simple owner of a useful
resource wishes to destroy it. In other words, I am not discussing instances of waste by a life
tenant, the destruction of co-owned property by one owner, A's destruction of B's property, or the
government's destruction of private property owned by a citizen. These are all interesting topics
about which much has been written. See, e.g., Hughes v. State, 56 P.3d 1088, 1094-95 (Alaska Ct.
App. 2002) (involving property destruction by one co-owner); Richard A. Epstein, A Common
Lawyer Looks at Constitutional Interpretation, 72 B.U. L. REV. 699, 718-20 (1992) (discussing
takings); John G. Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 U. CHI. L.
REv. 519, 533-36 (1996) (discussing waste in the life tenant and co-ownership contexts); Lior J.
Strahilevitz, Case Note, When the Taking Itself Is Just Compensation, 107 YALE L.J. 1975 (1998)
(discussing the government's destruction of private property).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
20051
The Yale Law Journal
owner who could destroy his property necessarily had the right to use it in
less extreme fashions. Blackstone's characterization of the English common
law echoed similar themes, limiting the owner's right to destroy only in
those cases where destruction occurred in a manner that threatened the
property rights of third parties. In this sense, we shall see that Blackstone
rejected John Locke's arguably narrower notion of ownership. In the
twentieth century, the right to destroy fell out of favor, and the most recent
literature has argued that such a right, if it exists at all, should be
substantially circumscribed on public policy grounds. Part I then offers a
definition of property destruction that steers the reader toward the
interesting, contested cases of destruction that affect future generations.
Part II examines the major argument courts have put forth to justify
limitations on the right to destroy one's own property-the fear that
valuable resources will be wasted. Most of the case law that limits the right
to destroy does so on this basis. While waste prevention is a valid basis for
restricting one's right to destroy, an analysis of the case law suggests that
courts often fail to appreciate the ways in which protecting the right to
destroy can enhance social welfare by protecting privacy, creating open
spaces, encouraging innovation and creation, or promoting candor and risk
taking. A critical reading of the cases suggests the various antiwaste rules
that courts have promulgated might well have resulted in diminished social
welfare by discouraging the creation of the valuable property courts are so
keen on protecting. Part II also considers contexts in which the law tolerates
substantial waste, focusing on organ transplantation policy and patent
suppression. These examples can help develop the broader case for
destruction generally. Indeed, society's unfortunate willingness to tolerate
substantial organ destruction renders the law's hostility to less harmful
destruction somewhat perplexing.
Part III explores the intangible benefits associated with property
destruction. When rational people destroy valuable property, they often do
so because of deeply held expressive interests. History provides many
examples in which valuable pieces of property have been destroyed by
owners who used destruction to gain attention for a cause or message. The
Article argues that under certain circumstances, these expressive interests
ought to trump the social waste that results from the destruction of valuable
property. It then suggests that the antidestruction provisions of the United
States's Visual Artists Rights Act provide a useful model for reconciling
society's interest in preserving irreplaceable works of art with the
expressive interests of property owners and the general public. Finally, Part
III concludes by exploring whether those who create property, particularly
intellectual property, ought to have expanded destruction rights.
Part IV examines testamentary destruction, a thread that runs through
much of the right-to-destroy case law. Most litigated cases involving
property destruction appear to arise in the testamentary context. The
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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conventional wisdom, expressed in the case law and scholarship, consists of
the idea that decedents' destructive will provisions should be invalidated,
because the dead have "nothing to lose" by destroying their property via
will. In other words, the self-interest that keeps most living owners from
destroying their valuable property during life fails to deter posthumous
destruction. I take issue with this conventional wisdom. An application of
the law governing future interests demonstrates that when a testator
executes a will providing for the destruction of property following her
death, she makes an immediate economic sacrifice by virtue of her inability
to alienate a future interest in the property. To the extent that there is a
moral hazard here, it arises if an unsophisticated testator does not recognize
the present value of a future interest in property she wishes to have
destroyed. Accordingly, I propose a novel safe harbor rule whereby a
testator who markets a future interest in her property and elects to forgo the
future interest's market value would be entitled to destroy valuable property
via will. This provision not only solves the moral hazard problem, but also
addresses the other objections to permitting posthumous destruction-
namely, concerns about testators' lack of information, social norms,
transaction costs, and the government condemnation process.
I. FUNDAMENTALS OF THE RIGHT To DESTROY
The right to destroy evidently received more attention in antiquity than
it does today. It appears that its historical and linguistic connections to the
Roman law right to abuse one's property have caused the right to fall into
disfavor via a form of guilt by association. Semantic and conceptual
difficulties related to the nature of destruction may have contributed to this
trend.
A. The Jus Abutendi
Under Roman law, the ability to destroy one's own property was
considered an important right of ownership. A Roman's property rights
consisted of the jus utendi fruendi abutendi: the rights to use the principal
(i.e., the property), to use the income generated by the property, or to
completely consume and destroy the property. 16 The Roman attitude toward
private property was often shorthanded tojus utendi et abutendi-an owner
had the right to use or to misuse his private property without the state's
interference.' 7
16. Max Radin, Fundamental Concepts of the Roman Law, 13 CAL. L. REV. 207, 209 (1925).
17. See Anton Hermann Chroust & Robert J. Affeldt, The Problem of Private Pro[p]erty
According to St. Thomas Aquinas, 34 MARQ. L. REV. 151, 175 (1951). By the later years of the
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A few early American courts picked up the notion of the jus abutendi
and incorporated it into their understanding of the property owner's basic
rights. They viewed the owner's right to destroy his property as the most
extreme use of property imaginable and suggested that if a landowner had
the right to destroy property, he certainly had the right to use or dispose of
it in a less dramatic manner.' 8 Several subsequent American decisions
eschewed the Latin phraseology, referring instead to a property owner's
common law "right to destroy" that which was his.
19
The English courts were rather sympathetic toward the destruction of
property as well, at least according to Blackstone's Commentaries. Indeed,
Blackstone read the common law of property so as to make it compatible
with his absolutist conception of ownership: "[T]he right of property [is]
that sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises over
the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any other
individual in the universe., 20 The common law's purported embrace of the
jus abutendi is more precisely indicated in Blackstone's discussion of
arson. Blackstone regarded arson as an "offence of very great malignity,
and much more pernicious to the public than simple theft... because in
simple theft the thing stolen only changes [its] master, but still remains in
esse for the benefit of the public, whereas by burning the very substance is
Roman Empire, the extreme version of the right to abuse was scaled back somewhat. Id. at 175
n. 131. This was particularly true with respect to the owner's treatment of his slaves:
Masters who murder their slaves are guilty of crime. But, if a slave dies during a
beating, there will be no investigation, even if it appears that the owner intended to kill
the slave. If, however, the owner employed means such as poison or threw the slave
over a cliff, the owner will be charged with murder. Even in this latter case, slaves and
freedmen cannot accuse their owner. It is suspect that Roman owners were seldom
convicted of murdering their slaves.
Alan Watson, Roman Slave Law: An Anglo-American Perspective, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 591, 598
(1996). Watson argues that the basis for these restrictions stemmed not from an interest in
protecting slave welfare or preserving public order, but from a desire to prevent an owner from
wasting a valuable asset that his heirs might otherwise inherit. Id. at 596.
18. See, e.g., Kingsbury v. Whitaker, 32 La. Ann. 1055, 1062 (1880) (opinion of Fenner, J.,
on application for rehearing) ("Suffice it to say, that the civil law recognizes [the right of
testamentary disposition] as a clear and distinct corollary of the right of property, jus utendi et
abutendi, under which the owner, provided he harm no other, may destroy and annihilate that
which belongs to him. If he may thus destroy it, and thereby defeat all possible control of the law,
it is difficult to perceive why, in exercising the option of leaving it in existence, he should not
have the right of determining its disposition after his death.").
19. See, e.g., Cass v. Home Tobacco Warehouse Co., 223 S.W.2d 569, 571 (Ky. 1949)
(noting a property owner's common law right to destroy his building); State v. Durant, 674 P.2d
638, 648 (Utah 1983) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Surely an attribute of ownership of property is the
right to destroy it unless it is done for the purpose of defrauding or injuring another in his person
or property. One who destroys his own habitation must surely be considered to have a 'license or
privilege'-indeed a right-to destroy it."). But cf Voss v. State, 236 N.W. 128, 130 (Wis. 193 1)
(rejecting an arsonist's claim that his conviction for burning his own property was
unconstitutional in light of its infringement of an asserted "right to destroy one's own property").
20. 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2.
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absolutely destroyed." 21  This hostility to wasteful destruction
notwithstanding, Blackstone suggested that under the common law a
property owner is free to bum down his own house, so long as the fire does
not threaten to spread to other people's property.2
John Locke's Second Treatise of Government is sometimes interpreted
to have questioned the existence of a right to destroy property.23 Locke
wrote,
As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life
before it spoils; so much he may by his labour fix a Property in.
Whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belons to
others. Nothing was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy.
Locke thus invoked divine justice as a basis for restricting the destruction of
property-a bold claim, given the prevalence of biblical property
destruction that was explicitly designed to demonstrate piety and curry
God's favor.25 In any event, it seems clear that under a Lockean conception
of waste, it is improper to kill a wild animal and then leave it to rot in the
forest.
While Locke's hostility to certain forms of property destruction seems
unambiguous, his text leaves a great deal of uncertainty regarding his
attitude toward destruction writ large. Does a man have the right to destroy
his property after mixing substantial amounts of his labor with it? Does a
man have the right to destroy his dwelling after living in it for decades and
extracting much of its value? Does a man have the right to destroy property
that he created out of thin air (e.g., a poem he composed)? If not, then why
doesn't man have an obligation to avoid wasting any of his labor as well?
These questions go unanswered by Locke. Indeed, some of Locke's readers
deem such questions irrelevant because the Lockean prohibition against
waste disappears as soon as man joins other men in a civil society.26
21. 4 id. at *220.
22. 4 id. at *221 ("The offence of arson (strictly so called) may be committed by wilfully
setting fire to one's own house, provided one's neighbour's house is thereby also burnt; but if no
mischief is done but to one's own, it does not amount to felony, though the fire was kindled with
intent to burn another's.... However such wilful firing one's own house, in a town, is a high
misdemesnor, and punishable by fine, imprisonment, pillory, and perpetual sureties for the good
behaviour.").
23. See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533, 1542 n.53 (1993);
Holmes Rolston, III, Property Rights and Endangered Species, 61 U. COLO. L. REV. 283, 302
(1990).
24. JOHN LOCKE, Second Treatise of Government, in Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT 285,
308 (Peter Laslett ed., Cambridge Univ. Press 2d ed. 1970) (1690).
25. See, e.g., Genesis 22:13-14; Exodus 29:38-42; Judges 6:18-22. On animal sacrifice
generally, see infra note 41.
26. See, e.g., Leo Strauss, On Locke's Doctrine of Natural Right, 61 PHIL. REV. 475, 494
(1952).
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Perhaps because of this ambiguity, early American jurists and scholars
seemed unmoved by Lockean condemnations of waste. To this day,
American courts evidently have ignored Locke's language regarding
spoilage or destruction, having failed to quote from it altogether.
In an often cited 1939 essay, Roscoe Pound identified six rights of
property ownership, the last of which was ajus abutendi right to destroy or
abuse. 27 Pound characterized then-recent jurisprudence as limiting the
power to abuse,28 but did not discuss whether these same limits were being
imposed on the power to destroy. Indeed, it is not clear that he
differentiated between abuse and destruction. Yet, upon reflection, abuse
and destruction cannot be conflated. One can destroy property without
abusing it (e.g., burning a confidential letter), and one can abuse property
without destroying it (e.g., whipping a donkey mercilessly). While there are
good reasons to limit the right to abuse property,29 I argue here that
destroying valuable property is sometimes socially beneficial.
Evidently dissatisfied with Pound's list of six, Tony Honor6 engaged in
a more ambitious effort to articulate the incidences of property ownership,
identifying eleven in his 1961 essay Ownership.3 ° One of these includes the
right to destroy property:
The right to the capital consists in the power to alienate the
thing and the liberty to consume, waste or destroy the whole or part
of it .... The latter liberty need not be regarded as unrestricted; but
a general provision requiring things to be conserved in the public
27. Pound's six rights were
a jus possidendi or right of possessing, a right in the strict sense; a jus prohibendi or
right of excluding others, also a right in the strict sense; a jus disponendi or right of
disposition, what we should now call a legal power; ajus utendi or right of using, what
we should now call a liberty; a jus fruendi or right of enjoying the fruits and profits;
and ajus abutendi or right of destroying or injuring if one likes-the two last also what
today we should call liberties.
Roscoe Pound, The Law of Property and Recent Juristic Thought, 25 A.B.A. J. 993, 997 (1939).
28. Pound wrote,
As to the liberty of abusing, both courts and legislators took this in hand long ago. The
Roman law early forbade cruel treatment of slaves. The law has long forbidden cruelty
to domestic animals. Statutes and judicial decisions have dealt with spite fences and
malicious diversions of water out of pure spite. While English law has not been willing
to create a general liability for malicious exercise of the jus utendi, yet it has become
willing to prevent exercise of that liberty out of spite to the detriment of a business
carried on by a neighbor.
Id. (some italics omitted).
29. Abusing property, by definition, is not socially beneficial. To "abuse" is "[t]o depart from
legal or reasonable use in dealing with (a person or thing); to misuse." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 10 (8th ed. 2004).
30. A.M. Honor6, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE 107 (A.G. Guest ed.,
1961); see also McCaffery, supra note 11, at 76-80 (discussing Pound's and Honor's views of
destruction).
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interest, so far as not consumed by use in the ordinary wa ,. would
perhaps be inconsistent with the liberal idea of ownership.
3
That is essentially all Honor6 wrote about the right to destroy.32 He
recognized that the right to destroy may well be an essential part of a
property owner's rights, but he left the reader wondering about why that is
so. I will argue that there are strong justifications, liberal and otherwise, for
permitting individuals to destroy their property. But because Honor6 never
elaborated on the point and very few thoughtful scholars have given the
issue much consideration, these justifications remain rather elusive.33
With the recent publication of Joseph Sax's Playing Darts with a
Rembrandt,34 the right to destroy one's own property has received its most
hostile treatment to date. On Sax's account, an art collector does not exactly
own a valuable painting that hangs in her living room. Rather, she is the
work's steward and ought to incur permanent legal obligations to preserve
it and make it accessible to scholars, art lovers, and members of the general
public.35 While Sax spends far more time discussing the problem of
destroyed cultural property than the solution, he appears sympathetic to the
enforcement of legal rules that bar the owner of such property from
destroying it, except in those cases where its owner is the artist or writer
who created it in the first place.36 Sax would abandon altogether the
traditional notion of the jus abutendi with respect to valuable or potentially
valuable cultural property. Instead, Sax favors limited ownership rights: An
owner of cultural property can continue to use it for her personal
enjoyment, but the law will prohibit destructive uses that deprive the
general public or future generations of a potential cultural resource.
31. Honor6, supra note 30, at 118.
32. Honor& also noted that "[m]ost people do not wilfully destroy permanent assets; hence the
power of alienation is the more important aspect of the owner's right to the capital of the thing
owned." Id. It should be noted that Honor& served as an academic adviser to the seventh edition of
Black's Law Dictionary, which seems to regard the right to destroy as peripheral or nonexistent.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
33. By far the best discussion of the American case law regarding the destruction of one's
own property is contained in Adam J. Hirsch, Bequests for Purposes: A Unified Theory, 56
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 33 (1999). Hirsch's article advocates a more unified approach to bequests
for purposes, and his discussion of cases involving the destruction of property via will is
contained in a section dealing with antisocial or bizarre bequests. Id. at 69-84. Other papers
dealing with similar topics are Frances Carlisle, Destruction of Pets by Will Provision, 16 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 894 (1981), and Abigail J. Sykas, Note, Waste Not, Want Not: Can the
Public Policy Doctrine Prohibit the Destruction of Property by Testamentary Direction?, 25 VT.
L. REV. 911 (2001).
34. SAX, supra note 9.
35. Id. at 68-72.
36. Id. at 200-01.
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B. What Is Destruction?
Before proceeding to the heart of the Article, a conceptual clarification
is necessary. What does property destruction mean? We have seen that prior
scholarly discussions of the jus abutendi varied in their conceptions of
destruction. It turns out that property destruction is harder to define than it
appears at first glance.
On the broadest reading of a right to destroy, an owner destroys
property every time she eats a piece of cake, falls asleep watching
television instead of working, or leaves an extra bedroom empty instead of
renting it to boarders. Such examples reference a right to destroy that
includes both consuming nondurable assets and failing to exploit economic
opportunities fully. McCaffery refers to the latter as wasteful nonuse.37 He
also introduces the concept of "nonurgent waste," meaning "nonurgent,
frivolous, or excessive consumption: poor choices of how to spend time or
value. 38 Under these broad definitions, human beings constantly destroy
property and virtually any antidestruction property rule would be
unworkable.39
Narrower conceptions of the right to destroy are possible. Destruction
might be defined as the elimination of all the value in a productive resource.
On this understanding of destruction, demolishing a historic castle would
not be destructive so long as the rubble was used by others for building
materials. Nor would suicide be destructive as long as the deceased's body
was used for compost. Now the universe of destructive acts has shrunk
beyond recognition. Every act of obliteration surely produces at least a
small benefit to someone or something--consider the nihilist who takes
pleasure in learning that a great building has been destroyed.n
Neither the broad nor the narrow economic definition of property
destruction seems particularly attractive, and even a middle-of-the-road
economic definition of property destruction (eliminating most of the present
value of a productive asset) will not comport perfectly with ordinary usage.
Creating a permanent crease in the center of a valuable baseball card may
render it essentially worthless as a collectible, but such folding seems more
like damaging than destruction. And it is certainly possible to destroy things
that have no market value: Killing an ailing, elderly hermit is indubitably an
act of destruction, even if the hermit makes nothing and knows no one. As
an analytical matter, then, the right to destroy is an elusive concept.
37. McCaffery, supra note 11, at 88-89.
38. Id. at 86.
39. McCaffery advocates administering antiwaste rules of this kind through the tax system.
Id. at 97-102.
40. McCaffery refers to a category of "dissipatory waste," meaning "the pure loss of value,
with none but some possibly perverse-to an Anglo-American at least-pleasure in the loss." Id.
at 85.
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Moving from economics to sociology, one finds that the meaning of
destruction has varied in different eras and among divergent cultures and
social groups. Slaughtering an edible animal and setting part of it ablaze, to
be consumed by no one, was considered a righteous act in biblical times,
4
'
but most major religions frown on the practice today. Similarly, burial
practices vary among the different cultures of the world, with societies
reaching very different conclusions about what property, if any, should be
destroyed along with a deceased person's body.42 While modernity has
curtailed the destruction of property that accompanies death, property
destruction retains cultural significance throughout much of the world. The
pifiata is a staple of childhood festivities in many Latin American cultures,
and Americans regularly spend hundreds of dollars on elaborate ice
sculptures for business functions and other important gatherings.43 Different
communities within a society may also disagree about the meaning of
destruction. While an artist would regard the nonconsensual separation of
his painting into multiple parts as destruction of the work, an entrepreneur
might regard such activity as socially beneficial unbundling.4
Given these considerations, there can be no perfect definition of
destruction. For reasons that will become apparent in Part IV, I adopt a
relatively narrow, economics-oriented definition of property destruction.
Destruction occurs when an owner's acts or omissions eliminate the value
of all otherwise valuable future interests in a durable thing. This definition
is more doctrinal than analytical, though it relies on a notion of value that
encompasses both legitimate and black market valuations. That said, a
definition that steers clear of cake, castle rubble, elderly hermits, and leisure
time will focus the reader's attention on the contested, and therefore
interesting, exercises of the right to destroy. More important, the definition
I have adopted captures what makes the destruction of a durable resource
different from all other uses of the same resource. Destroying property,
unlike selling or mortgaging it, necessarily has intergenerational
41. See sources cited supra note 25. Biblical passages differ on the fate of sacrificed food. In
some instances it was destroyed, see, e.g., Leviticus 1:2-13; in some instances it was used to feed
religious leaders, see, e.g., Leviticus 2:1-3; and in other instances it was consumed by those who
engaged in the sacrifice, see, e.g., Genesis 31:54. For a compilation of biblical references to
animal sacrifice, see William R. Harper, Constructive Studies in the Priestiy Element in the Old
Testament, in 18 THE BIBLICAL WORLD § 83, at 120, § 83, at 120-21 (William R. Harper ed.,
1901).
42. See generally CLARE GITTINGS, DEATH, BURIAL AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN EARLY
MODERN ENGLAND (1984); LESLIE V. GRINSELL, BARROW, PYRAMID AND TOMB: ANCIENT
BURIAL CUSTOMS IN EGYPT, THE MEDITERRANEAN AND THE BRITISH ISLES (1975).
43. The appeal of an ice sculpture stems largely from its fleeting existence. Sculptors could
easily work in longer-lasting translucent mediums, but the choice of a one-use-only medium
highlights the importance of the event at which the ice sculpture is displayed. An ice sculpture
essentially conveys the following message: "We've hired a talented artist to produce this unique
sculpture, and the people who attend this event are the only ones who will ever see it."
44. See, e.g., 136 CONG. REc. 12,609 (1990) (statement of Rep. Markey); Timothy M. Casey,
Note, The VisualArtists Rights Act, 14 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 85, 86 (1991).
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consequences, for better or worse. Given the centrality of intergenerational
justice as a consideration in the law generally, 45 we can understand the
right-to-destroy debate as an illuminating case study of the duties an
individual owner owes, not only to her contemporaries, but also to future
generations.
C. The Nature of the Right
While the right to destroy one's property has ancient origins, the
functional justifications for that right have not been well developed. Indeed,
the affirmative right-to-destroy literature has not progressed far beyond
early Roman law and its brief modem restatements by Pound and Honor6.
Until the publication of Sax's book and McCaffery's work, few scholars
had devoted much attention to the right to destroy, while a great deal of
attention has been lavished on some of the other property rights that Pound
and Honor6 recognized-the right to exclude, the right to alienate, the right
to use, the right to testamentary disposition, the right to mortgage, and the
like.
Why have these other rights gotten so much attention? The answer may
stem, in large part, from the high frequency with which they are placed at
issue in litigation. There are, by contrast, relatively few published opinions
that squarely implicate an owner's right to destroy his property. This fact
should not be surprising. A new homeowner is more likely to want to
exclude outsiders from his home than he is to want to raze it. Less valuable
kinds of property are destroyed all the time, but the low stakes involved and
restrictions on third-party standing combine to keep any resulting
disagreements out of the courts.
That said, the relatively small number of right-to-destroy cases that
have been litigated provide a rich opportunity to illuminate property law's
first principles. The right to destroy property is, after all, often an extreme
exercise of some of the more widely recognized sticks in the bundle of
rights. The right to destroy is an extreme version of the right to exclude; by
destroying a vase, I permanently exclude third parties from using it. The
right to destroy is also an extreme version of the right to use; by destroying
a piece of jewelry, I do not merely use it-I use it up. Finally, we might
understand the right to destroy as an extreme right to control subsequent
alienation. By destroying property, the owner can prevent it from ever
being resold or used in a manner that displeases her without running afoul
of the Rule Against Perpetuities. Indeed, the justifications traditionally
45. For explorations of intergenerational equity in various legal contexts, see Axel P.
Gosseries, What Do We Owe the Next Generation(s)?, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 293 (2001);
Lawrence B. Solum, To Our Children's Children's Children: The Problem of Intergenerational
Ethics, 35 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 163 (2001); and R. George Wright, The Interests of Posterity in the
Constitutional Scheme, 59 U. CN. L. REV. 113 (1990).
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given for inalienability rules are both similar to4 6 and different from 47 the
justifications given for restricting the destruction of one's property.
A discourse on this extreme property right quickly implicates some of
the most interesting, fundamental, and contentious questions in property
law. What is the nature of ownership? What obligations does a property
owner owe his neighbors? Are the foundations of property law libertarian
or instrumentalist? To what extent is a private property system wealth
maximizing? What are the appropriate roles of the dead hand and the
interests of future generations? Each of the right-to-destroy cases implicates
some of these important questions.48
There is also an important sense in which property destruction raises
one-of-a-kind issues. Scholars are conditioned to think about property law
as the way in which society divides up resources that have perpetual life.
Much of property law, most notably those provisions dealing with future
interests, presumes that the resource in question will survive forever. But
land is the only inherently perpetual form of property. Chattels, fixtures,
corporate entities, currency, and even intellectual property all can be
destroyed, meaning that an owner potentially has the ability to deprive
property of its perpetual life. The law of property destruction, then, is the
46. There are obvious connections between the law's increasing hostility toward the right to
destroy and its traditional resistance to restraints on alienation. Richard Epstein, Margaret Jane
Radin, and others have defended restrictions on alienability in particular circumstances. While
there is not enough space here to rehash the many interesting arguments in the literature, see, e.g.,
Richard A. Epstein, Why Restrain Alienation?, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 970 (1985); Margaret Jane
Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1987), it is worth noting that some of the
same reasons that prompt society to impose inalienability rules may prompt it to enact
antidestruction rules. For example, paternalistic concerns may explain why society bars an
individual from selling her kidney (alienation) or taking her own life (destruction). And concerns
about negative externalities may explain why the law bars both the sale of some sex acts and the
destruction of some valuable paintings. My arguments in this Article have implications for the
broader debate regarding restraints on alienation and dead hand control, but I will leave those
implications for future scholarship.
47. Hostility to restraints on alienation and openness to individuals' destruction of their own
property might be able to coexist peacefully in some cases. Part of the modem hostility to
restraints on alienation stems from the restraints' tendency to keep a resource away from its
highest-value user. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of Trusts in the
Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1258-60 (1985). As I will argue below, the destroyer
of property is sometimes its highest-value user and is using the resource to obtain privacy, media
attention, reputation, open space, or some other economically valuable resource. Moreover, the
objections to restraints on alienation might stem in part from additional factors, including the
transaction costs of enforcing inalienability rules and the demoralization costs experienced by the
would-be owner who wants to put property to its highest-value use but is prevented from doing so.
In both these instances, the destruction of a resource actually may fare better than a restraint on
the alienation of that resource.
48. For those reasons, the omission of the right-to-destroy cases from property casebooks is
disappointing. Among the leading casebooks, I believe that only Dwyer and Menell's includes a
case on the right to destroy. JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY:
A COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE 384-92 (1998).
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law that governs whether and under what circumstances the owner may
deprive a resource of its immortality.
II. PROPERTY DESTRUCTION AND WASTED RESOURCES
Based on a reading of recent judicial opinions, it appears that the
conventional wisdom has turned against permitting a property owner to
destroy valuable property. Courts have identified two closely related bases
for restricting the right to destroy. While excising theological strains from
Locke's antiwaste argument, they have embraced his notion that society
must not tolerate the waste of valuable resources. Moreover, courts have
stressed the negative externalities that might be associated with an
individual owner's destruction of her property.
A. Justifications for Preventing Destruction:
Waste and Other Externalities
Concern about wasting valuable resources is, by far, the most
commonly voiced justification for restricting an owner's ability to destroy
her property.49 In cases where a living person seeks to destroy her property,
the courts express concern about the diminution of resources available to
society as a whole. Where someone tries to destroy her property via will,
the court's focus is generally on preventing a loss to the estate and the
beneficiaries. In all circumstances, however, the court is concerned about
the negative externalities that would result from respecting property
owners' right to destroy.
1. The Destruction of Buildings
Perhaps the most prominent set of cases prompting concerns about
waste involve efforts by landowners to destroy their homes via will. The
leading case of this kind is Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co.50 The Eyerman
court was called upon to decide whether a provision in the will of Louise
Woodruff Johnston ought to be enforced. The will directed her executor to
have Johnston's attractive house on St. Louis's Kingsbury Place razed, the
land underneath it sold, and the proceeds from the land sale transferred to
49. See, e.g., McCaffery, supra note 11, at 91-96; Time, Property Rights, and the Common
Law, supra note 13, at 845-46. McCaffery's argument focuses on what he describes as "nonurgent
waste," rather than "dissipatory waste," which is my concern in this Article. See supra notes 37-
40 and accompanying text.
50. 524 S.W.2d 210 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975). For additional discussions of Eyerman and some of
the other cases cited herein, see Hirsch, supra note 33, at 69-84; Sykas, supra note 33, at 924-39;
and Teresa Wear, Recent Case, Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co. Nat'l Assoc., 41 Mo. L. REv.
309 (1976).
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the residue of the estate.5 ' Johnston's beneficiaries evidently did not object
to the razing of the home,52 but the neighbors did, and one month after
Johnston's death they convinced the city government to have Kingsbury
Place declared a historic landmark.5 3 The neighbors then sought injunctive
relief to prevent Johnston's executor from razing the home, arguing, inter
alia, that the destruction would depress property values in the
neighborhood.
The court held that the provision directing the executor to destroy the
home was unenforceable on public policy grounds. In the court's words,
"Destruction of the house harms the neighbors, detrimentally affects the
community, causes monetary loss in excess of $39,000.00 to the estate and
is without benefit to the dead woman. 55 Such destruction, the court held,
was simply intolerable in a "well-ordered society., 56 While this waste of
resources and damage to third parties cautioned against permitting
Johnston's wishes to be carried out, the court saw no countervailing
justification for respecting those wishes: "No reason, good or bad, is
suggested by the will or record for the eccentric condition., 57 Seeing
nothing but caprice in Johnston's instructions, the court refused to respect
them.
Eyerman contains within its pages many of the pertinent threads in the
right-to-destroy debate. Indeed, it begins to confront the institutional
competency questions that are at the heart of the matter. American property
law ordinarily deems the individual property owner to be in the best
position to evaluate how her property should be used. Exceptions arise in
two primary circumstances: (1) where certain uses will engender negative
externalities and (2) where the owner lacks the capacity to make a rational
judgment about how the property should be used. Although the Eyerman
court primarily focuses on the negative-externalities point in the destruction
context, its characterization of Johnston's will as "eccentric" and its
emphasis on Johnston's failure to explain her motivations suggests that the
second consideration is important here, too. I will focus first on the
externalities point and then consider issues involving a destroyer's capacity
in Part IV.
Most of the home destruction cases echo Eyerman's concerns about
wasted resources. For example, the In re Will of Pace court invalidated a
will provision directing the demolition of two homes on the grounds that
51. Eyerman, 524 S.W.2d at 211-12.
52. Id. at 218 (Clemens, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 219. The applicable landmark law evidently did not bar owners from destroying
their landmarked property.
54. Id. at 211, 213 (majority opinion).
55. Id. at 214.
56. Id. at 217.
57. Id. at 214.
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their destruction would reduce neighborhood property values, lower the
property tax base, and harm the estate's beneficiaries.58 In National City
Bank v. Case Western Reserve University, the court held that a will
provision directing the destruction of a home was not contrary to public
policy, but nevertheless directed the sale of the home to the local historical
society. 59 The only reported case in which a court actually ordered the
razing of a home in accordance with a will provision presented an odd set
of facts. The municipality that sought, on public policy grounds, to prevent
the testator's executor from razing the home had in previous years tried to
demolish the same home as part of an urban renewal project.60
Courts also strain to construe written instruments so as to avoid
acquiescing in the destruction of property. In re Estate of Jones involved a
will provision whereby the testator willed his real estate to the Society for
the Protection of New Hampshire Forests, subject "'to the condition that all
of the buildings on the homestead, with the exception of the original house,
shall be dismantled and disposed of by my executor as he, in his discretion,
58. 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492-93 (Sur. Ct. 1977). Joel Dobris brought to my attention an
unreported Rhode Island case, involving facts quite similar to Eyerman, discussed in Fox
Butterfield, Recluse's Will Creates Puzzle for Rhode Island, N.Y. TIMES, July 4, 1986, at A9. The
New York Times story quotes the speculation of several community members about the decedent's
motivations. Her neighbor, a psychiatrist, opined that "'the will represents anger, spite and
extreme jealousy' .... 'She was a very fussy, peculiar old lady and didn't want anyone else to
ever live there."' Id. Another neighbor, a trusts and estates attorney, speculated that 'she felt no
one could love the house the way she had."' Id. These explanations are hardly incompatible, but
reflect differing moral judgments about the acceptability of her motivations. Dobris's
correspondence with one of the attorneys involved in the case reveals that the court eventually
invalidated the destructive will provision on public policy grounds. Letter from David T. Riedel to
Joel C. Dobris (Aug. 24, 1990) (on file with author).
59. 369 N.E.2d 814, 818-19 (Ohio Ct. Com. P1. 1976). The court's reasoning in this case was
interesting. The court heard testimony on the testator's motivations for destroying her valuable,
architecturally significant home. Such testimony revealed that her "motive and purpose was to
prevent the house from being used as a rooming house or for commercial or business purposes
like many of the other former homes in the immediate neighborhood." Id. at 818. In the court's
view, that made the Eyerman case distinguishable.
The razing of the Vair house will not, like the razing of the house in the Eyerman case,
be a first step toward the deterioration of an exclusively residential neighborhood, but
rather would be an effective means of preventing a beloved home from debasement to
rooming house, business or commercial uses, as has already happened to many of the
homes in the neighborhood.
Id. This analysis seems strange at first glance, as the court essentially holds that permanently
preventing a building from being put to its highest-economic-value use does not violate public
policy. The court's analysis perhaps will make more sense in light of the expressive justifications
for a right to destroy discussed infra Part III.
60. In re Estate of Beck, 676 N.Y.S.2d 838, 841 (Sur. Ct. 1998) ("The Beck home, which
Anna Beck personally treasured and once fought to preserve from the city's very own wrecking
crews, was... clearly titled to her. At her death, it was [hers] to dispose of as she intended.
Ironically, the agency which now claims to champion its preservation on the basis of an undefined
public interest, was the very same agency that once went to court seeking its demolition under the
banner of urban renewal. That twist of fate is not lost on the court.").
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may deem best. ,,61 With respect to the remaining house, the will continued,
"'My executor shall have the further power... to decide whether the
original house is to be preserved for use and benefit of the Society or
whether it shall be also dismantled and removed."'' 62 Although these words
eliminated any ambiguity as to what the testator wanted done with all his
buildings but one, the New Hampshire Supreme Court somehow managed
to construe this language to give the executor discretion to sell all the
buildings to a third party.63 This was true even though demolition of the
buildings was consistent with the forest-loving decedent's intent to allow
forests on the property to reclaim the land where the other dwellings had
once stood.
In these home destruction cases, a number of third-party interests were
invoked to justify restricting a testator's right to destroy a home-the will's
beneficiaries' economic interests, the neighbors' economic interests in
neighborhood continuity, the public's interest in property tax revenues, and
the community's need for housing. Yet public policy rationales that seem
plain in one era evaporate during another era.64 Jones's forest preservation
sentiment makes more sense to the contemporary reader familiar with the
goals of the environmental movement than it did to a New Hampshire court
in 1978. A homeowner's gift of open space in a built-up neighborhood
61. 389 A.2d 436, 437 (N.H. 1978).
62. Id. (emphasis added).
63. Id. at 438. Exercising extreme creativity, the court noted, "In essence, such a conveyance
amounts to no more than a constructive dismantling of the buildings with the materials preserved
and later given to the museum for reconstruction on the same land." Id. So, assuming the executor
had the power to demolish and then rebuild these buildings, the executor presumably could opt for
the functional equivalent of refusing to demolish the buildings in the first place.
64. At least one court used some of the same public policy justifications to invalidate will
provisions that seek to prevent the destruction of existing buildings. In Colonial Trust Co. v.
Brown, 135 A. 555 (Conn. 1926), the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors invalidated a will that
sought to bar the construction of new buildings exceeding three stories on the site of an existing
three-story building. The court noted that, given the building's location and the cost of
maintaining the old building, the construction of newer, taller buildings might well be necessary
to maximize the value of the land. Id. at 564. The court noted that the restrictions were to remain
in place for seventy-five years and viewed their enforcement as against public policy because they
would "benefit no one" and pose "a serious threat against the proper growth and development" of
the neighborhood. Id. The Brown court deemed behavior that modem observers would consider
preservationist to be destructive. It should not be surprising that in the fifty years between Brown
and Eyerman, the courts' emphasis shifted from preventing testators' preservation efforts to
preventing testators from destroying buildings. After all, societal preferences regarding the
desirability of historic preservation shifted substantially during that time. See ANTHONY M.
TUNG, PRESERVING THE WORLD'S GREAT CITIES: THE DESTRUCTION AND RENEWAL OF THE
HISTORIC METROPOLIS 346-49 (2001). More surprising is the fact that the Eyerman court cited
Brown with approval and relied on its reasoning. Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d
210, 216-17 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) (quoting and relying on Brown, 135 A. at 564). While these
results exhibit courts' shifting attitudes toward building destruction and preservation, they can be
reconciled on the basis of both courts' hostility toward dead hand control.
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might seem like an act of generosity, not capriciousness, to the modem
reader.65
2. Destruction by Burial: Laws and Customs
A different set of public policy considerations emerges in cases
involving the destruction of chattel property via burial. In the case of
Meksras Estate, Eva Meksras wrote a will directing her executor to deposit
her diamonds, other jewelry, and other items of value in her casket for
burial.6 6 Invoking public policy to invalidate the will provision, the court
speculated that permitting the burial would be an invitation to grave
robbers, who would have access to the will given its status as a public
record.67 In the court's words,
If a practice is developed in our State to foster the burying of
valuables with a deceased, our cemeteries like the tombs of the
Phar[ao]hs will be ravaged and violated. The loved ones of the
deceased will experience the horror of the desecration, looting and
destruction of burial grounds, heaping indignities on the memory of
the dead.68
Deviating from the home destruction cases, the Meksras court did not
mention waste of scarce resources as a basis for denying the decedent's
request.69 Meksras is apparently the only published American case on the
question of the legality of burying valuable chattels along with a cadaver,
and it comes from a lower court in Pennsylvania. This is puzzling, given the
disparity between its holding and prevalent social norms, whereby people
are often buried wearing their wedding rings, expensive clothing, and other
65. See Hirsch, supra note 33, at 72 n. 141 ("Whereas it is a commonplace among realtors that
expensive homes raise the value of less expensive adjoining ones by increasing the attractiveness
of a street or a neighborhood, there is another side to the economic coin--open spaces in a
neighborhood are also attractive, and, as an elementary exercise in supply and demand, the fewer
homes available in a neighborhood, the higher the price of those left standing.").
66. Meksras Estate, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d 371, 371 (C.P. Phila. County 1974). The property
slated for burial had considerable value. Id. at 372.
67. Id. at 373.
68. Id.
69. Given the court's rationale, the failure to mention waste was appropriate. If grave robbers
were likely to reclaim the valuable jewelry buried in graves, then the resources would not be
wasted from society's perspective. Rather, they would be recycled through the black market or
returned to the heirs of the decedent if recovered by the authorities. See Charrier v. Bell, 496 So.
2d 601, 604-05 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (holding that artifacts recovered from Native American burial
sites are the property of the descendants of those tribes). If one wholeheartedly embraces a waste
avcidance theory with respect to buried property, then one begins to see the actions of grave
robbers in a rather positive light. Cf GARDEN STATE (Fox Searchlight Pictures 2004) (showcasing
Peter Sarsgaard's sympathetic portrayal of a grave robber).
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items of considerable value.7° Indeed, the reported cases dealing with grave
robbing suggest that the Meksras rule is not adhered to universally.71
The Meksras court supposed that grave robbers will examine wills at
the county courthouse and then target those graves that contain buried
72treasures. This premise only seems plausible if the probate process
necessitated an accounting or inventory of estate property, but such
documents are not always made public for probated wills. 73 Thus, a testator
might deflect grave robbers' attention by directing his burial along with the
"contents of the top drawer of my bedroom desk." The court's logic also
assumes that grave robbers can obtain information about probated wills
without attracting the attention of authorities. Even taking the court's
suppositions at face value, though, most of the harm associated with grave
robbing would be internalized by each estate. A testator would come to
understand that she can take it with her, but that if she does so, she will run
a higher risk that her grave will be targeted by grave robbers.74 One
70. Indeed, the law of at least one state recognizes the need to bury clothed cadavers. See
N.D. CENT. CODE § 11-19.1-15 (2001). Other cultures have had strong norms directing the burial
or cremation of valuables along with their owners. See GITTINGS, supra note 42, at 111;
GRINSELL, supra note 42, at 30-38, 50-53; Francis King Carey, The Disposition of the Body After
Death, 19 AM. L. REV. 251, 254-61 (1885); Sykas, supra note 33, at 917-22 (discussing various
ancient cultures' practices of burying or cremating valuables along with the deceased). Henry
Ordower characterizes past and present practices in the following manner:
In early cultures, it was customary to inter considerable property . . . with the
corpses of wealthy decedents to provide for the decedent in the next life. Most later
cultures generally abandoned this practice, in part because it was economically
inefficient. The practice deprived the society of the current use of the wealth after death
and cultivated the grave robbing industry. On the positive side, burial finds provide
archaeologists opportunities to study cultures for which no, or only a sparse, written
record exists.
With limited exceptions for specific items with particular sentimental value to the
decedent, most decedents today do not attempt to take personal property with them,
although courts occasionally abide by exceptional wishes of decedents, such as
interment in an automobile.
Henry M. Ordower, Trusting Our Partners: An Essay on Resetting the Estate Planning Defaults
for an Adult World, 31 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 313, 331 n.47 (1996) (citation omitted).
71. See, e.g., Temant v. Boudreau, 6 Rob. 488, 491 (La. 1844) (involving a property dispute
over "a gold chain, a gold buckle, a pair of diamond earrings, two diamond rings, [three] gold
rings, two broken rings, ... six small diamonds[,] and... a diamond necklace" that were recovered
from criminals who had robbed Madame Temant's grave); State v. Lewis, 293 S.E.2d 638, 639
(N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (involving the removal of jewelry from graves); see also VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
13, § 3761 (1998) (criminalizing the intentional removal of"an object interred or entombed with a
human body"); Julie Brienza, Advocates for Reform of Funeral, Cemetery Industry Are Never at
Rest, TRIAL, Nov. 1998, at 14, 14 (noting the desecration of a Florida woman's grave that
included family heirlooms, a gold wedding band, and other jewelry). For a scholarly perspective
on the prevalence of grave robbing in many cultures, see GRINSELL, supra note 42, at 101-09.
72. Meksras, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d at 373.
73. See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 3-706, 3-708 (amended 2003); Mary F. Radford & F. Skip
Sugarman, Georgia's New Probate Code, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 605, 752-54 (1997); Earl D.
Tanner, Jr., Wills v. Trusts, UTAH B.J., Oct. 1997, at 18, 18.
74. A savvy decedent may wish to have her jewelry destroyed or cremated along with her
body, thereby precluding the valuables from coming into the possession of the grave robber. See
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supposes that a person who cares about her postmortem environment
enough to request burial with valuable jewelry is particularly likely to be
offended by the prospect of her grave being pillaged.75 Assuming,
arguendo, the enactment of a mandatory will and inventory disclosure law,
permitting decedents to be buried with their property would give will
drafters and heirs all the right incentives. Indeed, it is hopefully not too
grotesque to suggest that such a policy would give grave robbers the right
incentives too, by preventing scattershot desecration. Efficient grave
robbers no longer would target graves haphazardly, digging up graves that
contain nothing of value.
That is not to say that allowing people to be buried with their valuables
engenders no third-party harms. The court simply latched onto the wrong
negative externalities. The primary inefficiency that would have resulted
from a prodestruction rule stems from increased expenditures on cemetery
security, which would seem to be a deadweight loss. There also would be
substantial welfare losses associated with third parties' revulsion at the
thought that nonrelatives' graves might be robbed.
So was Meksras rightly decided or not? Ordinary people seem to get a
lot of utility, during life, from the thought that they will be buried wearing a
wedding ring or that a particularly sentimental item will be deposited in
their casket. On a personhood account of property, one can say that such
property is likely to have merged with the decedent.76 A loyal deceased
generally GRINSELL, supra note 42, at 60-67 (discussing the prevalent custom in foreign cultures
of smashing valuables deposited in the decedent's grave); Carey, supra note 70, at 269-70
(hypothesizing that cremation eventually will become the norm as a means of preventing grave
robbers from stealing one's corpse).
75. Grave robbing also harms the deceased victim's loved ones, as the Meksras court
mentions. Meksras, 63 Pa. D. & C.2d at 373; see also King v. Smith, 72 S.E.2d 425, 426 (N.C.
1952) (recognizing that the blood heirs of a deceased person whose grave is desecrated have a
cause of action); Bennett v. 3 C Coal Co., 379 S.E.2d 388, 392 (W. Va. 1989) (same). Indeed, the
heirs of a decedent evidently have the legal right to take action to prevent the desecration of their
loved one's grave, including the right to disinter the grave and retake possession of buried
valuables. On this point, see the remarkable case of Ternant v. Boudreau:
[T]he jewels which were put in the tomb of the defendant's mother .... may have been
placed there in compliance with the last wishes of the deceased .... but although
concealed in the bottom of a grave, and perhaps protected only by the respect which the
living are naturally disposed to bear to the ashes of the dead, it cannot be denied, that
they were corporeal things within the domain of ownership, and therefore subject to be
taken possession of by the rightful owner, (the heir of the deceased,) and to be by him
sold or alienated. If however indecorous, and even infamous, the act might have been,
the heir of the deceased had claimed those jewels, or taken them in possession, who
could, under our laws, have disputed his right? The right of ownership belonged to
him, and no one could have prevented him from exercising it in its fullest extent.
6 Rob. at 492-93 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). In other words, jewels buried in a
decedent's grave belong to the heirs and can be removed by the heirs at any time. English law
seemingly is in accord regarding the ownership of such property. See DAVIES' LAW OF BURIAL,
CREMATION AND EXHUMATION 65 (David A. Smale ed., 7th ed. 2002).
76. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957,
959-60 (1982) (noting that wedding rings are often "bound up" with their owners' personalities).
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spouse, then, really is the highest-value user of a valuable wedding ring.
Hence, a rule permitting such burials, rather than Meksras's harsh
antidestruction rule, follows the proper approach.
That said, there is a point at which the destruction may become
excessive, and we ought to, in the absence of a bona fide religious custom,
require the decedent to designate only the few objects that mean the most to
her for burial. There is little plausible economic benefit associated with
permitting extravagant burials, and they might prompt wasteful spending on
graveyard security. Furthermore, it seems unlikely that the market for
jewels and heirlooms would be adversely affected if people were barred
from taking them to the grave.77 Nor is it likely that a rule barring the
interment of valuables will prompt people to destroy these jewels during
their lifetimes. Given the low transaction costs of imposing antidestruction
rules on the heavily regulated funeral home industry, capping the value of
such buried goods seems appropriate.
In the real world, funeral homes appear to behave in precisely the
manner I have just described. The harsh Meksras antidestruction rule is
softened by a social norm that evidently permits the destruction of
reasonable amounts of valuable jewelry and heirlooms.78 It evidently is left
to the discretion of next of kin and funeral directors to decide how much
destruction crosses the line. In this instance, at least, what the law gets
wrong, the applicable social norm gets right.
B. Contexts in Which We Tolerate Substantial Waste
It turns out that burial practices are not the only context in which
American traditions permit the destruction of valuable property. Indeed,
there are contexts in which both the law and prevalent social norms
encourage the destruction of especially valuable societal resources.
When a young man or woman is killed in an automobile accident,
society suffers a terrible loss. Yet in most cases, an even more senseless
loss transpires in the hours following death. That deceased young adult is
likely to be able to contribute a "usable heart, pancreas, liver, two kidneys,
two lungs and intestines,.., enough to save a half-dozen or more lives in
some cases."79 But most transplantable organs in the United States are
77. The market for those types of property that all people expect to take with them to the
grave would be adversely affected by restrictions on the right to destroy property. Coffins, which
are created for the purpose of being destroyed, are the quintessential example. See Ware v. State,
121 S.E. 251, 251 (Ga. Ct. App. 1924) (affirming the larceny conviction of a man who dug up a
grave, removed the coffin, and reinterred the cadaver, with the intent of reusing the coffin in a
subsequent funeral).
78. See supra note 4.
79. Richard Prez-Pefia, Downside to Fewer Violent Deaths: Transplant Organ Shortage
Grows, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 19, 2003, at B 1.
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needlessly destroyed.80 As a result, there are more than 82,000 Americans
on organ transplant waiting lists,8 1 and 6000 Americans die preventable
deaths every year, waiting for organs that never arrive. 82 It is difficult to
imagine a more perplexing waste of scarce societal resources.83
In the United States, the law by and large respects the wishes of those
who want to have these valuable organs decompose along with their
bodies.84 Indeed, the government makes it rather difficult for someone to
avoid organ destruction. An American wishing to donate his organs or those
of a recently deceased relative generally must affirmatively opt in to organ
donation,85 and this opt-in requirement substantially lowers donation rates.86
80. See Ellen Sheehy et al., Estimating the Number of Potential Organ Donors in the United
States, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 667, 671 (2003) (finding that forty-two percent of potential organ
donors donate); Randi Hutter Epstein, How Diplomacy in Handling Death Can Save Lives, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 19, 2003, at F5 (discussing the Sheehy study).
81. Sheehy et al., supra note 80, at 668.
82. Prez-Pefia, supra note 79; see also Michele Goodwin, Altruism's Limits: Law, Capacity,
and Organ Commodification, 56 RUTGERS L. REV. 305, 311 (2004) (noting that the 6000-deaths
statistic "does not include those who were never placed on the waitlists, died while on dialysis, or
had limited access to medical treatments").
83. The discussion that follows treats organs as a societal resource, just like other forms of
property. Some readers may question whether organs are sensibly categorized as "property." I
regard the issue of whether any particular resource is or is not "property" as a meaningless and
indeterminate question. See generally JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 93-94
(5th ed. 2002) (discussing this issue in the context of Moore v. Regents of the University of
California, 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990)). Organs are generally market-inalienable forms of property,
but that does not stop them from being property. Id. at 93 & n.42. Nor does a resource's status as a
market-inalienable good preclude the possibility of government condemnation. Through
conscription, the government seizes rights over conscripts' bodies and labor that no employer
could ever hope to obtain via contract. Indeed, Locke's opposition to slavery was predicated on
the idea that humans were property, but that each individual necessarily owned his own body.
LOCKE, supra note 24, at 305-06 ("[E]very Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body
has any Right to but himself. The Labour of his Body, and the Work of his Hands, we may say,
are properly his." (emphasis omitted)).
In any event, the law generally refers to quasi-property rights in bodies of decedents, because
of discomfort with the notion of property in the human body. See Charles M. Jordan, Jr. & Casey
J. Price, First Moore, Then Hecht: Isn't It Time We Recognize a Property Interest in Tissues,
Cells, and Gametes?, 37 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 151, 172 (2002); Paul M. Quay, Utilizing the
Bodies of the Dead, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 889, 914-15 (1984). Evidently, the linguistic difference
between quasi-property and property does not dictate divergent legal treatment unless quasi-
owners wish to use a body in a manner that runs counter to the social interest in avoiding the
mistreatment of cadavers. For an illuminating discussion of the relationship between property and
quasi-property in this context, see Radhika Rao, Property, Privacy, and the Human Body, 80 B.U.
L. REv. 359, 382-87 (2000).
84. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 2(e), (i) (1987); Fred H. Cate, Human Organ
Transplantation: The Role of Law, 20 J. CORP. L. 69, 71-74 (1994). For an argument that the law
provides too little protection for the testator who wishes to avoid having his organs used for
transplant, see Quay, supra note 83, at 891-95.
85. See Cate, supra note 84, at 81-83.
86. See Adam J. Kolber, A Matter of Priority: Transplanting Organs Preferentially to
Registered Donors, 55 RUTGERS L. REV. 671, 688-89 (2003); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H.
Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REv. 1159, 1191-92 (2003).
When the decedent has remained silent on his willingness (or lack thereof) to become an organ
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
20051
Although the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act provides that the decedent's
decision to donate his organs is decisive, hospitals typically will not harvest
them unless his family also consents, even where the decedent has signed
an organ donor card.87 In many cases where a decedent has indicated a
desire to donate his organs on his driver's license, family objections prevent
the transplantation of organs.88 Finally, in cases where a decedent has
multiple next of kin (e.g., a parent survived by several children), the
objections of any one relative can prevent a transplant as a practical
matter.89 In short, either a decedent or his heirs usually can block physicians
from transplanting his organs. The impediments that American law and
donor, the decedent's next of kin may elect to donate his organs. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 7151(a) (West Supp. 2004); UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 3(a). But, again, if
the next of kin are silent or cannot be located, donation typically will not occur. See Daniel G.
Jardine, Comment, Liability Issues Arising out of Hospitals' and Organ Procurement
Organizations' Rejection of Valid Anatomical Gifts: The Truth and Consequences, 1990 WiS. L.
REV. 1655, 1658. Some states have embraced limited exceptions to this regime. See, e.g.,
Maryellen Liddy, Note, The "New Body Snatchers": Analyzing the Effect of Presumed Consent
Organ Donation Laws on Privacy, Autonomy, and Liberty, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 815, 827-29
(2001).
87. See Leonard H. Bucklin, Woe unto Those Who Request Consent: Ethical and Legal
Considerations in Rejecting a Deceased's Anatomical Gift Because There Is No Consent by the
Survivors, 78 N.D. L. REV. 323, 327-34, 337-42 (2002); Anthony J. Langone & J. Harold
Helderman, Disparity Between Solid-Organ Supply and Demand, 349 NEW ENG. J. MED. 704,
704 (2003); Donald D. Hensrud, Brother, Can You Spare a ... , FORTUNE, May 26, 2003, at 176.
This rule, assuming it is widely understood by members of the public, should create an ex ante
effect, whereby those who wish to donate their organs take precautions to ensure that their
relatives understand their wishes. Of course, many organ donors are killed unexpectedly and did
not want to contemplate their own premature demise, so the topic of organ donation may never
have come up in conversation.
88. See Bucklin, supra note 87, at 337, 340-42; Monique C. Gorsline & Rachelle L.K.
Johnson, The United States System of Organ Donation, the International Solution, and the
Cadaveric Organ Donor Act: "And the Winner Is . ..," 20 J. CORP. L. 5, 32 nn.284-85 (1994);
Hensrud, supra note 87, at 176. The best data on this subject comes from a study by William
DeJong and coauthors, who noted that 10% of nondonor families elected not to donate even
though their dead relative had expressed a wish that his or her organs be used for transplantation.
William DeJong et al., Requesting Organ Donation: An Interview Study of Donor and Nondonor
Families, 7 AM. J. CRITICAL CARE 13, 17 tbl.3 (1998). Among nondonor families, 30% knew that
the deceased did not wish to donate his or her organs, and 61% did not know the deceased's
wishes. Id. By contrast, 32% of donor families knew the deceased wished to donate, only 1% of
donor families knew that the deceased did not wish to donate, and 67% of donor families did not
know the deceased's wishes. Id. In short, families were usually ignorant about whether the
deceased wanted his or her organs to be transplanted, but in cases where they knew the deceased's
wishes, families were noticeably more likely to override the deceased's preference for donation
than the deceased's preference for nondonation. For a discussion of the DeJong findings, see E.
Guadagnoli et al., The Public's Willingness To Discuss Their Preference for Organ Donation with
Family Members, 13 CLINICAL TRANSPLANTATION 342, 342 (1999).
89. See DeJong et al., supra note 88, at 20. DeJong reports that there were disputes among
next of kin in 22% of situations where more than one person was involved in the decision about
whether to donate. Id.
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custom place in the path of the socially responsible would-be donor are
substantial. 90
Maybe a moral society should implement a stringent antidestruction
rule barring posthumous destruction to prevent this waste. The government
might, for example, nationalize the cadavers of all those who perish in the
United States and allow for burial or cremation only after any usable organs
have been transplanted into those who need them most.91 The United States
instead embraces the owner's seemingly absolute right to destroy his own
organs at death and gives heirs the right to destroy organs despite the
decedent's contrary wishes, regardless of the consequences that will be
suffered by innocent third parties. Is this deferential attitude toward
destructive wishes justifiable?
Perhaps. Several sensible justifications for deferring to destructive
wishes emerge. If many Americans view organ harvesting as an act of
desecration, one that violates deeply held moral or religious convictions,92
then a goverment that attempts to use force to prevent organ destruction
will encounter substantial social and political resistance from relatives of
the deceased.93 Moreover, those who earnestly wish to keep their bodies
intact may adopt deathbed strategies designed to thwart the government's
initiative or may direct the removal of their bodies to friendlier
90. They also help contribute to a sense of regret among a sizeable minority of next of kin
who elect not to donate a loved one's organs. Whereas 94% of donor respondents said, four to six
months after their loved one's death, that they would make the same decision in hindsight, only
66% of nondonor respondents said the same. Id. at 14, 20.
91. See A.H. Barnett & David L. Kaserman, The Shortage of Organs for Transplantation:
Exploring the Alternatives, 9 ISSUES L. & MED. 117, 123 (1993). Barnett and Kaserman sensibly
note that kidney conscription "is likely to meet with overwhelming objections" from the public.
Id. China and Serbia have instituted kidney-conscription regimes for executed prisoners. See
Curtis E. Harris & Stephen P. Alcom, To Solve a Deadly Shortage: Economic Incentives for
Human Organ Donation, 16 ISSUES L. & MED. 213, 225 (2001).
92. Perhaps surprisingly, 73% of next of kin who do not consent to donate their loved one's
organs do not believe that organ donation violates the tenets of their religions. DeJong et al., supra
note 88, at 18 tbl.4. By contrast, the same percentage of people evidently agree with the statement
that "[ilt is important for a person's body to have all of its parts when buried." Id. Families who
elect not to donate a loved one's organs thus appear to be acting for moral or aesthetic reasons that
operate independent of religious beliefs. For an analysis of the religious context in which some
organ donation occurs, see Khalil Jaafar Khalil, Comment, A Sight of Relief: Invalidating
Cadaveric Corneal Donation Laws via the Free Exercise Clause, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
159, 160-64 (2002).
93. See James F. Childress, Ethical Criteria for Procuring and Distributing Organs for
Transplantation, in ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION POLICY: ISSUES AND PROSPECTS 87, 98-99
(James F. Blumstein & Frank A. Sloan eds., 1989) (discussing public opposition to nonconsensual
organ harvesting). Even voluntary transactions with relatives might encounter substantial moral
and practical difficulties. See Henry Hansmann, The Economics and Ethics of Markets for Human
Organs, in ORGAN TRANSPLANTATION POLICY, supra, at 57, 70 (noting the ethical dilemmas
associated with asking grieving relatives to donate their loved ones' organs). But see Richard A.
Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Utility the Ruler of the World?, 1995 UTAH L. REV.
683, 712-14 (advocating a market approach for the allocation of organs).
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jurisdictions.94 Finally, government exercises of the condemnation authority
with respect to human body parts will strike many as inherently
unacceptable. So while respecting an individual's right to destroy his
kidney seems highly questionable on welfarist grounds, a reasonable person
might remain sympathetic to exercises of the right in light of the existence
of a well-developed prodestruction norm.
C. Houses Versus Organs: An Exploration
It appears from the previous discussion that the law defers to
destructive impulses that are widely shared and typically ignores more
idiosyncratic destructive requests. Hence, someone's expressed wish to
allow his organs to decay after his demise will be respected in every
jurisdiction, but his expressed wish to have his house destroyed upon his
death will be thwarted by most courts. To the extent we can read these
policies as efforts to maximize welfare, the law appears to be conflating
widespread practices with morally correct and socially beneficial practices.
As a proxy for social welfare, the law appears to have looked primarily to
the presumed motives of the destroyer-when judges believe that the
destroyer is acting because of antisocial motivations, they prohibit
destruction, and when they believe that the destroyer is acting out of
prosocial motivations, they permit it. But what could be more antisocial
than allowing one's kidney to rot in one's grave instead of using it to save
the life of a fellow human being? The act/omission distinction cannot
justify the law's divergent treatment of houses and organs: If someone
ordered his executors to leave his cat in his empty house for sixty days,
without food or water, surely that omission would be invalidated by the
court, because it would result in the cat's death. 95
Two factors seem to explain the divergent treatment of organs and
houses. The first is society's uneasiness with certain kinds of expressive
acts, and the second is divergent social norms. Part III explores the
expressive point in detail, but it is worth addressing the norms point here. It
is common for people to destroy their own organs upon death but
uncommon for people to destroy their own homes upon death. One
supposes that if the norms were reversed, such that posthumous home
destruction was common and posthumous organ destruction was rare, the
94. Cf Adam J. Hirsch & William K.S. Wang, A Qualitative Theory of the Dead Hand, 68
IND. L.J. 1, 11 (1992) ("Were lawmakers to rescind the power of the will, testators would find
other, less efficient ways to direct the distribution of their wealth.").
95. See Capers Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121, 133 (C.P. Allegheny County 1964); see also id.
at 134 (referring to an unpublished Florida case that invalidated a will provision directing the
destruction of the decedent's pet dog); Sykas, supra note 33, at 930-34 (discussing unreported pet
destruction cases from several states).
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law's relative tolerance for these two kinds of destruction would flip as
well.
There is some appeal to an approach that defers to existing norms, no
matter how inefficient those norms may become.96 After all, laws that
comport with dominant social norms can be enforced more efficiently than
those that do not.97 But the law also plays an important and necessary role
in shaping social norms, 98 and it seems likely that the law is partially
responsible for the unconscionable waste of transplantable organs that kills
thousands of Americans every year. There is no justification for a legal
presumption that usable organs should be destroyed where relatives fail to
object to their removal. In sixteen percent of all cases involving
transplantable organs, families are never even asked whether they are
willing to donate the organs. 99 Here the law and prevailing practices are
perplexing. A decedent's unambiguous instructions to destroy a home are
disregarded, but parents often are presumed to believe that their children's
valuable organs should be destroyed.'00 A better rule would permit organ
destruction only in those cases where the decedent or a majority of his heirs
have requested such action unambiguously. The government's aim ought to
be the inculcation of an anti-organ-destruction norm among American
citizens.
D. Justifying Destruction: When Destruction Is Creation
So far, this Article has focused on ex post analysis to evaluate the law
regarding destruction. On occasion, however, it has pointed to the relevance
of ex ante considerations. 1°' This Section gives that line of argument more
sustained attention and shows how an ex ante perspective can be
determinative when society must decide whether to permit or prohibit the
destruction of certain kinds of property.
The destruction of valuable property rarely fares well when viewed
from an ex post perspective. The Johnstons have built a house, and it is a
perfectly habitable house; destroying it would be a terrible waste of scarce
societal resources. Indeed, the Eyerman court seemed particularly resistant
to allowing Johnston to destroy her home in light of the reduction in
96. For a discussion of inefficient norms and possible governmental responses, see Eric A.
Posner, Law, Economics, and Inefficient Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1697 (1996).
97. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms Problem,
67 U. CHI. L. REV. 607, 607-09 (2000); Saul Levmore, Norms as Supplements, 86 VA. L. REV.
1989, 1998-99, 2006-08 (2000).
98. Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 910 (1996).
99. Sheehy et al., supra note 80, at 671.
100. This destructive presumption is particularly maddening in light of the statistics showing
that when families are asked to donate their loved ones' organs, fifty-four percent agree to do so.
See id.
101. See supra text accompanying notes 74, 77, 94.
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housing stock that St. Louis had experienced during the 1960s.10 2 What
sense does it make for society to allow someone to remove a valuable,
durable asset from the marketplace? And yet for nearly one hundred years,
American patent law has recognized the patentee's right to do just that.
1. Patent Suppression
In a fascinating 1908 opinion called Continental Paper Bag Co. v.
Eastern Paper Bag Co., the Supreme Court held that Eastern Paper Bag
Company, the patentee of William Liddell's improved technology for
manufacturing paper bags, was entitled to suppress the Liddell patent
during the full life of the patent term.10 3 Eastern neither developed the
patented invention nor licensed it to competitors who wished to bring it to
market. 10 4 Instead, Eastern continued selling its inferior (previously
patented) paper bag machines, which the company believed would be more
profitable than the improved machines. 0 5
Continental Paper Bag Company sought to bring the Liddell invention
to market and, in light of Eastern's refusal to license the patent, did so.
Predictably, Eastern sued for infringement and sought injunctive relief.
Continental argued that while damages would be appropriate, no court of
equity should issue an injunction to protect a patentee who intended to
suppress an invention for the full patent term. 0 6 Surely, Continental argued,
102. Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 214 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) ("We are
constrained to take judicial notice of the pressing need of the community for dwelling units as
demonstrated by recent U.S. Census Bureau figures showing a decrease of more than 14% in St.
Louis City housing units during the decade of the 60's. This decrease occurs in the face of
housing growth in the remainder of the metropolitan area." (footnote omitted)).
103. 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908). The connection between the right to destroy real property and
the right to retain patent rights without exploiting the invention was noted briefly in Valerian E.
Greaves, The Social-Economic Purpose of Private Rights: Section 1 of the Soviet Civil Code: A
Comparative Study of Soviet and Non-Communist Law (pt. 2), 12 N.Y.U. L.Q. REV. 439, 462
(1935).
104. Cont'l Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 427-28 ("The record also shows that the complainant, so
to speak, locked up its patent. It has never attempted to make any practical use of it, either itself or
through licenses, and, apparently, its proposed policy has been to avoid this.... We have no
doubt that the complainant stands in the common class of manufacturers who accumulate patents
merely for the purpose of protecting their general industries and shutting out competitors."
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
105. Id. at 428-29 ("It was the purpose to make more money with the existing old
reciprocating Lorenz & Honiss machines and the existing old complicated Stilwell machines than
could be made with new Liddell machines, when the cost of building the latter was taken into
account. And this purpose was effective to cause the long and invariable non-use of the Liddell
invention, notwithstanding that new Liddell machines might have produced better paper bags than
the old Lorenz & Honiss machines or the old Stilwell machines were producing." (internal
quotation omitted)). Eastern's behavior only could have been profit maximizing if its earlier
machines were patented.
106. Id. at 423.
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it violated equitable principles to protect a monopolist's profits at the cost
of withholding from the public a valuable technological innovation.
Eight Justices sided with Eastern. The Court used Blackstonian,
formalist rhetoric, noting that an "'inventor is one who has discovered
something of value. It is his absolute property. He may withhold [the]
knowledge of it from the public, and he may insist upon all the advantages
and benefits which the statute promises to him who discloses to the public
his invention.,, 10 7 Because property rights were absolute, the Court
reasoned, a patentee had an absolute right to exclude anyone who wanted to
develop the invention: "[S]uch exclusion may be said to have been of the
very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is the privilege of any
owner of property to use or not use it, without question of motive."'
0 8
Although the majority invoked the notion of an absolute right to
exclude in affirming the lower court's injunction against Continental, the
case as the Court understood it seems to implicate the right to destroy. At
least on the facts presented to the Court, Eastern intended neither to bring
the invention to market nor to allow anyone else to do so for the full term of
the patent. 0 9 On this account, the seventeen-year monopoly is granted and
then essentially destroyed in its entirety. Consumers plainly are left holding
the bag, as it were, having to make do with inferior products while the
possibility of a superior product is cruelly dangled in front of them on the
patent registry. Revealingly, Justice Harlan's brief dissent suggests he saw
this turn of events in the same way the Eyerman court would see Johnston's
will decades later.1 10 The suppression of a useful invention is a waste of a
valuable economic resource that the public cannot tolerate. 11 Ultimately,
107. Id. at 424 (quoting United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, [250] (1897)).
108. Id. at 429.
109. There is some reason to be skeptical of this claim. Surely there was some amount of
money that Continental or another competitor could have paid Eastern to license the Liddell
patent, but such a sum exceeded the anticipated profits that the competitor could have earned from
sales of the improved machine. One further expects that, toward the end of the term for its
previous patents, Eastern would have brought the improved Liddell machines to market as a way
of maintaining its dominant market share. It is not clear from the record how long the lapse was
between the expiration dates of the earlier patents held by Eastern and the expiration date of the
Liddell patent. For a helpful discussion of the economics of patent suppression, see ROBERT P.
MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 290 (3d ed. 2003).
110. Justice Harlan's two-sentence opinion noted that "the facts are such that the court should
have declined, upon grounds of public policy, to give any relief to the plaintiff by injunction."
Cont '1 Paper Bag, 210 U.S. at 430 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
111. Nearly four decades later, in Special Equipment Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370 (1945), the
Court reaffirmed its holding in Continental Paper Bag. This time, the vote was five to four, the
majority's opinion was less self-assured, and the dissent more vigorous. See, e.g., id. at 383
(Douglas, J., dissenting) ("It is difficult to see how [the suppression] of patents can be reconciled
with the purpose of the Constitution 'to promote the progress of science and the useful arts.' Can
the suppression of patents which arrests the progress of technology be said to promote that
progress? ... Take the case of an invention or discovery which unlocks the doors of science and
reveals the secrets of a dread disease. Is it possible that a patentee could be permitted to suppress
that invention for seventeen years... and withhold from humanity the benefits of the cure?").
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the majority's view carried the day, as Congress codified part of the holding
in Continental Paper Bag, so that a patentee's failure to use or license an
invention does not excuse third parties' infringement.
1 12
Viewing the patent process ex post, the holding of Continental Paper
Bag appears nonsensical. There is no good reason to grant someone a
monopoly right to a valuable invention if he intends to use that right to
suppress the invention. Conditioning the continuation of patent rights on the
patentee's reasonable use or licensing of the invention seems like a no-
brainer. 113 As Justice Harlan's dissent indicated, a court should, on public
policy grounds, refuse to enjoin a third party's infringement of a suppressed
patent. This hostility to patent suppression sounds in Lockean themes: If
someone removes an idea from the public domain, he cannot waste it by
prohibiting society from using it altogether.
Viewed ex ante, however, a plausible justification for the result in
Continental Paper Bag emerges. It might be the case that were companies
like Eastern not permitted to obtain blocking patents to protect their
previous patents, they would not make the necessary investment of
resources into inventing either the previous inventions or the blocking
improvements. In other words, the availability of blocking patents may be a
necessary part of the incentives that the patent system uses to encourage
innovation in particular industries.' 14 When faced with the choice between
(a) a decent paper bag machine and a blocking patent on an improved, but
suppressed, machine and (b) a substantial probability that neither machine
will be invented, choice (a) seems acceptable.
There is, of course, a real chance that this defense of Continental Paper
Bag's holding amounts to a just-so story more often than not, and there is a
112. 35 U.S.C. § 271(d)(4) (2000) (providing that the refusal to "license or use any rights to
the patent" does not amount to patent misuse).
113. Or perhaps not. In some instances, we might imagine a civic-minded organization
purchasing patent rights in order to suppress an invention that, while demanded by some
consumers, would generate substantial perceived negative externalities. Imagine the Sierra Club's
purchase of a patent on an automobile engine that would generate enormous horsepower and
substantial pollution. More provocatively, reasonable people might disagree about what the courts
should do if a group wanted to acquire the patent to a morning-after pill such as RU-486 for the
purpose of suppressing the drug.
The suppression of a patented invention may be less troublesome than the destruction of a
durable economic resource like a house or a piece ofjewelry. After all, a patent is necessarily time
limited, and upon the expiration of the patent term, the invention will be resurrected, available to
all as part of the public domain. That said, Eastern's suppression of the Liddell invention seems
much more troublesome than Johnston's destruction of a solitary house. Patent suppression can
prevent anyone from using not only the invention itself, but also all reasonable functional
equivalents. Whereas Johnston's home could be rebuilt following its destruction, albeit at a
substantial cost, there is no corollary right to replace or substitute an invention that has been
removed from the stream of commerce during the patent term.
114. See generally Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property
Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 1013 (1997) (discussing the role that blocking patents might play in
promoting the invention of improvements upon existing patented products).
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lot of empirical uncertainty here that should not be ignored. Perhaps the
possibility of licensing the earlier invention without the opportunity to
suppress the second invention would have given Eastern enough incentive
to invent the first. And perhaps other companies would have developed
both the first and second inventions within a few months or years had
Eastern never done so. In such cases, permitting Eastern to suppress the
second invention for the full patent term seems a high price to pay for
speedier introduction of the first invention. All we can say with certainty is
that there will be some instances where permitting the destruction of
intellectual property helps establish the right incentives for the creation of
valuable intellectual property, and we never will know whether Continental
Paper Bag was such a case. This raises the question of whether the right to
destroy other kinds of property can be understood in a more favorable light
if viewed ex ante.' 
15
2. Presidential Papers
The destruction of diaries and other papers is commonplace, even when
those written works have enormous economic value. As Nixon v. United
States makes clear, American presidents repeatedly have destroyed diaries,
correspondence, and other personal effects, either during their lifetimes or
via will. 1 6 Throughout the nation's history, a powerful custom existed
giving the President ownership of his presidential papers. 17 Private
ownership of these papers evidently entailed a right to destroy them.
According to the D.C. Circuit's opinion in Nixon, there are "numerous
examples of Presidents willfully and intentionally destroying their
presidential papers. '18 They include Van Buren, Garfield, Arthur, Grant,
Pierce, and Coolidge.1 19 The heirs of Presidents Harding and Fillmore also
destroyed large numbers of presidential papers following the deaths of
those Presidents. 120 Some of Abraham Lincoln's papers were destroyed by
115. Cf STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 68 (2004)
(suggesting that constraints on the testamentary disposition of property can diminish incentives to
create such property in the first place); Hirsch & Wang, supra note 94, at 8-11 (discussing and
critiquing the connection between deference to the wishes of testators and incentives for testators
to create and accumulate wealth).
116. 978 F.2d 1269, 1279-80 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Years after the D.C. Circuit's remand, I
worked on this case for the Nixon estate, researching issues relating to just compensation for
Nixon's presidential papers.
117. Id. at 1282-84.
118. Id. at 1279.
119. Id. at 1279-80.
120. President Fillmore willed his presidential papers to his son, and the son's will directed
that all the papers be destroyed. Id. at 1291. President Harding's widow destroyed many of his
papers following Harding's death. Id. at 1294.
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his heirs as well. 2 The destruction of these papers occurred even though
the Library of Congress repeatedly approached presidents and their heirs,
offering "fancy sums" to purchase collections of presidential papers.
22
Presidents and presidential descendants well understood the economic and
historical value of their official papers and nevertheless set them ablaze.
Numerous Supreme Court Justices behaved likewise. 23 These presidents
and other public officials were not behaving irrationally. Rather, they were
destroying the papers to protect their privacy and the privacy of their
associates.1
24
The case of President Garfield is particularly striking. Garfield was shot
by an assassin on July 2, 1881 and was ailing until his death on September
19, 1881.125 During these last months of his life, he destroyed large portions
of his personal and political files.126 After Garfield's death, his children
donated the remaining papers to the Library of Congress.
27
Largely in response to the fallout from Watergate and the Nixon papers
dispute, Congress enacted the Presidential Records Act of 1978,128
prospectively abolishing private ownership of presidential papers. 129 The
Act makes it difficult for the President to destroy any of the presidential
papers that are produced during his tenure. The President may not dispose
of any records that have "administrative, historical, informational, or
evidentiary value,"' 30 a category that presumably includes virtually all
presidential records.' 31 If the President wishes to destroy presidential
records that lack administrative, historical, informational, and evidentiary
121. Jonathan Turley, Presidential Papers and Popular Government: The Convergence of
Constitutional and Property Theory in Claims of Ownership and Control of Presidential Records,
88 CORNELL L. REv. 651, 660 (2003).
122. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1282, 1282-83 (internal quotation marks omitted).
123. SAX, supra note 9, at 94-95.
124. Turley, supra note 121, at 731 ("Still others view the value of ownership as the right to
destroy the papers to preserve a legacy."). According to Turley,
Presidents and their heirs could clearly have sold these documents for some profit,
rather than destroy them. No rational actor would destroy an item of value that could be
sold at a profit, except if the presence of "tastes" or soft variables supplied a different
type of benefit in destruction. These tastes are often highly personal and directly at
odds with the public value of the documents. For Nixon, the destruction of
incriminating material was of tremendous personal value. In fact, the personal value in
the destruction of the records to Nixon was directly proportional to the public's value in
preservation, due to a shared view of the importance of the records in evaluating his
presidency.
Id. at 718 (footnote omitted).
125. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1292.
126. Id. at 1279.
127. Id. at 1292.
128. 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207 (2000).
129. Id. § 2202.
130. Id. § 2203(c).
131. "Personal records," which are documents that do not concern the President's official
duties, are excluded from the Act and can be destroyed by the President. Id. § 2201(2)(B)(ii), (3);
see also Turley, supra note 121, at 667 & n.89.
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value, he may petition the Archivist of the United States for permission to
do so. If the Archivist concludes that said records are of no "special interest
to the Congress" and that "consultation with the Congress regarding the
disposal of these particular records" is not "in the public interest," then he
may provide the President with written authorization to destroy the records
in question. 132 Only upon receiving the Archivist's written authorization
may the President destroy a particular record. 1
33
One strongly suspects that given the hassle associated with destroying
even the most insignificant scrap of presidential parchment, a rational
president whose rights are restricted by the Presidential Records Act of
1978 will create a less interesting paper trail than his relatively
unconstrained predecessors. When in doubt, the President simply will
neglect to memorialize an important idea or communication. 134 Indeed, in
discussing the right to destroy presidential papers, President Taft noted that
the historically interesting documents are the ones least likely to be
preserved by their creators:
It has long been the custom for the important Ambassadors of Great
Britain to carry on a personal correspondence with the Secretary of
State for Foreign Affairs, which is not put upon the files of the
department, but which gives a much more accurate and detailed
account of the diplomatic relations of Great Britain than the official
files. The only way in which historians can get at this, is through
the good offices of the families of the deceased Ambassadors and
Foreign Secretaries in whose private files they may be preserved.'35
If a president anticipates that at a later date he will be able to decide
whether to destroy an embarrassing, revealing, or controversial document,
he will be more likely to create and save it in the first place. 136 Historians
132. 44 U.S.C. § 2203(c), (e).
133. Id. § 2203(c). As Turley points out, Executive Order 13,233, 66 Fed. Reg. 56,025 (Nov.
1, 2002), issued by President George W. Bush, strengthens the hand of the President vis-A-vis the
Archivist if the President wishes to restrict access to certain papers. Turley, supra note 121, at
671-76. Notably, the Executive Order does not restore the President's traditional power to destroy
presidential papers. Id. at 687.
134. The Act does provide that "the President shall take all such steps as may be necessary to
assure that the activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect the performance of his
constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties are adequately documented." 44
U.S.C. § 2203(a). It is difficult to imagine a less enforceable provision in the United States Code.
135. Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269, 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (quoting W[ILLIAM]
H[OWARD] TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND His POWERS 34 (1916)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
136. Joseph Sax recognizes this point, and then dismisses its importance:
Undoubtedly the prospect of public access discourages putting very candid, politically
sensitive material down on paper, though the exigencies of the job impose limits on the
ability of officials to refrain from making a paper or electronic record. According to
Stephen Hess, a White House staff member for both President Eisenhower and
President Nixon, most presidential advisers do not have unlimited access to the
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writing in the future hopefully will be able to evaluate whether the 1978
Act's antidestruction rule caused post-Carter presidents to leave behind less
revealing paper collections than previous executives did. 137
While perhaps best illustrated in the context of the right to destroy
personal papers, the ex ante perspective illuminates a number of other areas
in which incentives for the creation of valuable property might depend on
the presence of a robust right to destroy. E-mail use is another example.
Because investigators and litigants have become capable of reconstructing
e-mails that the senders and recipients believed were erased,138 many people
have become much more reluctant to discuss controversial or sensitive
matters in e-mails, and some valuable communication has been deterred
altogether. 139
3. Historic Preservation
Historic preservation of buildings presents an interesting illustration of
this ex ante perspective in the real property context. Historic preservation
statutes typically limit the rights of landowners to demolish buildings that
President and so must commit their views and advice to writing to get it before him. In
addition advisers write memoranda to protect themselves by assuring that their
positions are accurately memorialized. Former presidential advisers as well as former
cabinet officials who testified before a National Study Commission set up to examine
the status of presidential papers agreed that so long as confidentiality could be
protected for a reasonable time, disincentives to creation of written records would be
effectively eliminated.
SAX, supra note 9, at 86. This analysis, of course, does not apply to presidential papers created by
the President himself. A president's concern about the judgment of historians, combined with the
certainty of historians' scrutiny, may well prevent him from memorializing revealing notes about
his thoughts and motivations.
With respect to lower-level executive branch officials, one imagines that those who hope for
plum postings in the future will disagree with Hess's take, particularly if they have written about
matters on which popular opinion has shifted in the intervening years. Analogously, the White
House and the Justice Department categorically refused to turn over to the Senate Judiciary
Committee memoranda that Miguel Estrada had written while working for the Solicitor General's
Office between 1992 and 1997. Helen Dewar, Deadlock over Estrada Deepens; White House
Rejects Democrats' Requests for Nominee's Memos, WASH. POST, Feb. 13, 2003, at A4; Charles
Lane, Lawmakers Press Nominee; Democrats Seek Memos, Challenge Estrada s Credibility,
WASH. POST, Sept. 27, 2002, at A5. The failure to turn over the memoranda left Democratic
senators suspicious about Estrada's views and ultimately resulted in a filibuster and Estrada's
failure to gain confirmation for a seat on the D.C. Circuit. Jan Crawford Greenburg, Embattled
Judicial Nominee Withdraws, CHI. TRIB., Sept. 5, 2003, § 1, at 1.
137. The Act has applied to all presidents since Ronald Reagan. Nixon, 978 F.2d at 1296-97.
138. See JEFFREY ROSEN, THE UNWANTED GAZE: THE DESTRUCTION OF PRIVACY IN
AMERICA 7, 55 (2000); Oma Rabinovich-Einy, Going Public: Diminishing Privacy in Dispute
Resolution in the Internet Age, 7 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 129 (2002), http://www.vjolt.net/vol7/
issue2/v7i2_a04-Rabinovitch-Einy.pdf.
139. See generally K. Robert Bertram, Avoiding Pitfalls in Effective Use of Electronic Mail,
69 PA. B. ASS'N Q. 11, 13 (1998) (urging limitations on the inclusion of sensitive information in
company e-mails).
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have been designated as landmarks. 140 When someone tries to destroy his
own property, and courts have a chance to prevent the destruction, there is a
danger that loss aversion will steer judges in the wrong direction. 141 This is
particularly true in cases involving homes and other buildings. Judges may
grow fond of vintage buildings or defer to people who love buildings that
have long been part of a neighborhood landscape. Judges, legislators, and
ordinary citizens have a much more difficult time imagining the structures
that will replace these venerable buildings, even though virtually every
landmark building in a major city stands on a site that was previously
occupied by some other structure. 
142
For much of the nation's history, the judiciary's Blackstonian,
absolutist notions of ownership trumped these tendencies to preserve the
old regardless of the cost to the new. So when it considered People ex rel.
140. See, e.g., Kalorama Heights Ltd. P'ship v. D.C. Dep't of Consumer & Regulatory
Affairs, 655 A.2d 865, 869 (D.C. 1995); see also Susan Rose-Ackerman, Inalienability and the
Theory of Property Rights, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 931, 954 (1985) (noting that the New York City
landmarks law "only rarely allows demolition" of historic buildings); David F. Tipson, Putting the
History Back in Historic Preservation, 36 URB. LAW. 289, 306 (2004) ("Most ordinances require
a permit for demolition within the historic district, but many allow demolition after a certain
period of time if the landowner has made a good-faith effort to sell the property. Savannah,
Charleston, and Alexandria take this approach. Some ordinances do contain an absolute
prohibition on demolition without a permit from the review board." (footnote omitted)).
141. See Georgette C. Poindexter, Light, Air, or Manhattanization?: Communal Aesthetics in
Zoning Central City Real Estate Development, 78 B.U. L. REv. 445, 500 (1998) ("The
endowment effect suggests that an existing building is more valuable than one not yet built."). For
a brief synopsis of the loss aversion phenomenon, see REID HASTIE & ROBYN M. DAWES,
RATIONAL CHOICE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDGMENT AND DECISION
MAKING 308-10 (2001).
142. Perhaps no city illustrates the creative possibilities of destruction better than Rotterdam.
In 1940, the German Luftwaffe leveled the entire city center. H.W. Koch, The Strategic Air
Offensive Against Germany: The Early Phase, May-September 1940, 34 HIST. J. 117, 129 (1991).
Following the war, city planners saw the destruction of the historic center as an opportunity to
build a new kind of ultramodern European city. They succeeded. See, e.g., Rodney Bolt, The City
Doesn't Give a Damn, SUNDAY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 1, 2001, Travel, at 3; Joan Ockman,
Urban Rebirth: Cities Coping with Disaster Offer Lessons for Rebuilding New York's World
Trade Center Site, ARCHITECTURE, Sept. 2002, at 41, 42-43. The enormous scale of the
destruction provided an opportunity to rethink, and improve upon, the urban environment. Of
course, other cities facing similar circumstances have done less with the opportunity than
Rotterdam. See Ockman, supra, at 43 (discussing the botched postwar reconstruction of
Plymouth, England).
No reasonable person would deny the harm that is done when buildings with great historic or
architectural value are demolished or destroyed, see generally CARLA LIND, LOST WRIGHT:
FRANK LLOYD WRIGHT'S VANISHED MASTERPIECES 10 (1996) (noting that 118 of the
approximately 500 buildings designed by Frank Lloyd Wright no longer exist). One claim of this
Article, however, is that overprotection of existing buildings will result in some future buildings
never getting built. As society becomes increasingly hostile to the right to destroy, there is a
strong possibility that the pendulum will swing too far toward overprotection of extant structures.
Indeed, the British architect George Ferguson has begun advocating government subsidies to tear
down ugly high-rises that blight urban landscapes and have not endeared themselves to neighbors
in the decades since their construction. See Alan Riding, A Building Is an Eyesore and Must Go?
Grade It X, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at El.
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Marbro Corp. v. Ramsey in 1960, an Illinois appellate court found it quite
natural to hold that a building owner was entitled to a demolition permit
where the costs of repairing and maintaining a historically significant
building were high and where the owner would still lose money operating
the building if it were fully renovated at the public's expense. 143 Implicit in
this holding is the sensible view that destroying a building in order to
maximize the value of the land on which it sits is not property destruction at
all-rather, it is an improvement to the parcel as a whole.'
44
Three decades later, the Blackstonian notion of absolute ownership had
receded to the point where courts ratified ill-considered policies that forced
landowners to expend large sums maintaining teetering buildings. In one
such case, J.C. & Associates v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals &
Review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals denied a property
owner's request to destroy a fire-damaged building that, in the opinion of
several experts and a city building inspector, was on the brink of
collapse. 145 The building had been designated a historic landmark before the
fire, but the fire had rendered it an eyesore and the costs of rehabilitating it
appeared prohibitive to several experts who testified or filed reports. 146
Some commentators have argued that the possibility of future landmark
designation and the associated limitations on future uses will discourage
property owners from commissioning great buildings. 47 I agree with
143. 171 N.E.2d 246, 247-48 (Il1. App. Ct. 1960). This rule in some ways anticipates the
Supreme Court's ruling in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which held that a per se
taking occurred where a government regulation deprived a landowner of the entire value of his
property. 505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992). The landowner in Marbro argued that if he was forced to
maintain the current structure on his property, he could not make any money off it-meaning that
the preservation regulation essentially reduced the land's value to zero. Marbro, 171 N.E.2d at
247-48.
144. Somewhat similar issues can arise in the context of chattel property. Fans of Babe Ruth
and Elvis Presley recently watched in horror as entrepreneurs announced plans to cut up a game-
worn jersey and an intact master tape associated with these respective dead celebrities. See Ross
Forman, In 2004, Part of Bambino's Legacy Will Go to Pieces, USA TODAY, June 26, 2003, at
3C; Robin Pogrebin, All Shook Up over Cutting and Selling of Elvis Tape, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 28,
2004, at El. Rules that barred the disaggregation of these pieces of memorabilia might prevent
their highest-value use, although such regulation probably would not engender takings liability.
Unlike a building owner who is forced to maintain a building that is draining his wealth, an owner
of a unique Babe Ruth jersey or Elvis tape retains a valuable asset even if the state forces her to
keep it intact. Cf Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978) (setting
forth a balancing test used to evaluate most regulatory takings claims, which includes the extent of
the diminution in the property's value as part of the takings calculus).
145. 778 A.2d 296, 298-300 (D.C. 2001). The District presented evidence to suggest that the
building was salvageable. Id. at 300.
146. Id. at 299-300.
147. See, e.g., Mendes Hershman, Critical Legal Issues in Historic Preservation, 12 URB.
LAW. 19, 28 (1980) ("One untoward and unfortunate consequence of the Penn Central decision
may be the discouragement of distinguished architecture, of design which represents an
outstanding illustration of a certain architectural style or period because of the developer's fear of
thereby freezing the building against future demolition, alteration, or redevelopment.").
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William Fischel that this precise possibility is a "bit far-fetched."' 148 Under
existing laws, the time lag between a building's groundbreaking and its
designation as a historic landmark is usually long enough that any concerns
about future landmarking will be discounted by most developers. 149 That
said, there will be instances in which the decisions a building owner makes
after the completion of construction affect the building's chances of being
designated a historic landmark. For example, the owner of a building that
has some historic or architectural merit-but that will not become eligible
for landmark designation for ten more years-might maintain the exterior
of the building poorly or remove the most architecturally interesting
ornamentation in the years preceding landmark eligibility. 150 These acts or
omissions might substantially reduce the likelihood of costly government
regulation in the not-too-distant future.
Those who wish to limit the right to destroy further, however, propose
to eliminate the time lag that currently causes developers to discount the
possibility of future landmark designation when designing a new building.
Joseph Sax argues that "[w]e already have well-established systems for
classifying and protecting historic structures, and it would be a rather small
step to create a new category that designates distinguished, newer
architectural masterworks, and offers them some protection."' 51 Sax then
suggests that governments could adopt a range of regulatory options to
protect new architectural triumphs. 1
52
Sax's proposal is no "small step." Restricting the alteration or
destruction of new buildings could have enormously deleterious
148. William A. Fischel, Lead Us Not into Penn Station: Takings, Historic Preservation, and
Rent Control, 6 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 749, 754 (1995) ("There is one other thing that might
discipline landmarks preservation laws in the long run. It is the possibility that because sometime
in the future a building might be designated a landmark or otherwise subjected to uncompensated
regulation, landlords will begin hiring mediocre architects or asking good architects to design
mediocre buildings that will not be landmarked. Now, this idea struck me as a little bit far-
fetched.").
149. See Gregory A. Ashe, Reflecting the Best of Our Aspirations: Protecting Modern and
Post-Modern Architecture, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 69, 71 (1997) (discussing the thirty-
year time lag required under New York City's historic preservation law); Angela C. Carmella,
Landmark Preservation of Church Property, 34 CATH. LAW. 41, 43 (1991) (noting that the
minimum age required for a building to be landmarked can range from twenty-five to seventy-five
years).
150. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 67 (5th ed. 1998). Dean Lueck and
Jeffrey Michael support a similar claim with respect to endangered species habitats. Their study of
forest land in North Carolina revealed that landowners harvest timber prematurely if their land is
proximate to red-cockaded woodpecker habitat as a means of preventing the woodpeckers from
establishing habitats on their land. Dean Lueck & Jeffrey A. Michael, Preemptive Habitat
Destruction Under the Endangered Species Act, 46 J.L. & ECON. 27 (2003). On their account, the
Endangered Species Act's substantial restrictions on landowners' use of land containing the
habitat of endangered species encourage landowners to destroy habitat that might be suitable for
endangered species but is not yet populated by them.
151. SAX, supra note 9, at 199 (emphasis added).
152. Id.
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consequences with respect to developers' incentives to commission great
architectural works. Such a developer would be locking in a particular
parcel to its current use perpetually, without regard to changes in market
conditions or social tastes. The developer also would need to invest
substantial resources in ensuring that the architect selected the appropriate
designs and building materials because the local government could deter or
even preclude functional or aesthetic changes at a later date.
153
Contemporaneous limitations on the destruction or modification of
buildings would also deny landmark commissions the hindsight and
perspective that can be so useful in evaluating a building's merits. Simply
put, the destruction or modification of a new building is usually supported
by compelling circumstances. The prospect of immediate limitations on the
right to destroy almost certainly would do more harm than good and would
substantially dampen builders' incentives to commission great works.
154
Whatever the economic consequences of immediate landmarking, Sax
sees a moral basis for imposing such requirements on the owners of new
buildings:
[W]hile the patrons (or owners) of an important work of
architecture were not obliged to engage with a masterwork, having
done so they have by their own voluntary act potentially made the
community worse off than it would have been if they had never
acted. It is insufficient to say that the work would not have existed
without their patronage. For they have diverted the time and effort
of an artist from other work he might have done, and that-in other
hands-might have been better protected .... 155
According to Sax, the patron who decides to destroy a great building has
wasted the architect's time and prevented him from working on other
masterpieces that would have been preserved for generations.
153. During the 1980s, several new skyscrapers clad in Carrara marble had to be resurfaced
because the marble unexpectedly failed in cold-weather conditions and had the potential to fall off
the buildings. Michael Arndt, Amoco Tower's Fate May Be Carved in Stone, CHI. TRIB., May 22,
1988, § 7, at 4. Most famously, Chicago's 1136-foot Amoco Building (now Aon Center) had its
marble replaced with granite seventeen years after its construction, at a cost of sixty to eighty
million dollars. Lindsey Tanner, Amoco Caught Between Rock, Hard Place, WASH. POST, Mar.
31, 1990, at E16.
154. There is a way in which Sax's proposal might be improved. The law could permit a
developer to opt out of subsequent landmark designation by paying a fee to the city government
during the construction process. By paying such a fee, the developer would obtain a long-term, or
even perpetual, transferable right to modify or demolish her structure. A carefully calibrated fee
structure could diminish the incentive to avoid building grand structures by giving developers on
the margins a more palatable alternative option. Such a regime would be similar in many ways to
the Visual Artists Rights Act's waiver provision, whereby artists who do not particularly care
whether their works are destroyed can reap higher payments from patrons in exchange for waiving
their rights to prevent destruction. See infra text accompanying notes 187-190.
155. SAX, supra note 9, at 58.
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Sax's argument ultimately is unconvincing. Great architects have strong
economic and artistic motivations for seeing that their better works are
preserved for future generations. Architects are thus good agents for the
public. But there are other things, besides preservation, that great architects
are trying to maximize when negotiating projects with clients. Architects
typically want clients who can offer substantial resources, high-profile
building sites, favorable zoning environments, hands-off supervision, and
many other perks. Renowned architects will select their projects based on a
combination of all these factors, and there will be difficult tradeoffs among
them. It therefore seems strange to impose preservation requirements on
clients without simultaneously mandating that clients fully fund architects'
visions (and happily pay for unanticipated overruns), provide large building
sites that maximize architects' flexibility, generously pay off neighbors and
zoning board officials to ensure that their objections do not limit the
architects' freedom of action, and so on. Indeed, because preservation
covenants will be at least somewhat costly to architecture clients, we can
expect that forced preservation will leave clients with fewer resources to
spend on building materials, zoning variances, extra land, and all the other
factors that might make a building worth preserving.
Requiring the preservation of great buildings may ensure that some
beautiful and potentially influential designs never get built. The 1893
Chicago World's Columbian Exposition provides perhaps the most famous
example of an architect trading off permanence for other project attributes.
The gifted architect Daniel Burnham oversaw the construction of glorious
white buildings made of plaster of Paris and hemp fibers. The buildings
were temporary structures, but they proved profoundly influential, helping
to usher in a neoclassical revolution in architecture and providing a
blueprint for the great Chicago civic structures that would be built in the
decades that followed. 156 Had Burnham's "Great White City" been built of
anything sturdier, it never would have been as large, nor would it have been
built as quickly, as cheaply, or as magnificently. Permanence is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for great architecture. 5 7 There is a
place in our landscape for gorgeous sandcastles.
In short, there can be a clear connection between property destruction
and creation. When individuals and businesses destroy valuable property,
they often do so for rational reasons. Denying owners the right to destroy
156. DONALD L. MILLER, CITY OF THE CENTURY: THE EPIC OF CHICAGO AND THE MAKING
OF AMERICA 380-85 (1996).
157. Indeed, some great architecture or art is only permitted because of its fleeting nature.
Germany allowed Christo to wrap the Bundestag after he promised that the wrapping would be
temporary. Mary Williams Walsh, Artist Christo Puts the Reichstag Under Wraps, L.A. TIMES,
June 24, 1995, at F4. Were the law to require Christo's wrappings to be permanent, he would have
a hard time executing such works.
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property that becomes embarrassing, unfashionable, unproductive, or
obsolete threatens the impulses that spur future creation.
E. Our Distaste for Waste: An Assessment
To the extent that society has curtailed the property owner's common
law right to destroy that which is his, waste avoidance has been the primary
basis for doing so. In principle, there is nothing wrong with this. Setting
aside ex ante considerations, social welfare generally is diminished when
valuable resources are obliterated. That said, some segments of society
sincerely wish to destroy valuable property from time to time. These
destructive sentiments can be common (as with personal papers, wedding
rings, or transplantable organs) or rare (as with buildings or patents), but
when they do arise, individual motivations to destroy seem rather powerful.
As the prevalence of these sentiments increases and the transaction costs
associated with monitoring and preventing destruction rise, the case for
antidestruction rules generally becomes weaker.
Even in those settings where destructive impulses are idiosyncratic and
the transaction costs of preventing destruction are low, courts have reached
rather unsatisfying conclusions. In the home destruction cases, courts
seemed oblivious to positive externalities that might be associated with the
creation of open space or woodlands. And as preferences changed over
time, as with respect to historical preservation, the social meaning of
destruction was flipped on its head.
In other instances, antiwaste sentiments can obscure the social waste
that results from excessive preservation or insufficient creation. Urban real
estate is a scarce commodity, and the city that places too many of its
structures off limits to modem architects risks economic and aesthetic
stagnation. Limiting the right to destroy based on waste and other negative
externalities may be reasonable in theory, but a review of the published
cases suggests courts have trouble applying this defensible rule.
Once we begin thinking about the ex ante effects of antidestruction
rules, additional concerns come to the forefront. At some level, a right to
destroy property is essential to the functioning of a market economy. The
value of a new refrigerator would decrease substantially if its owner was
required to keep it working as a refrigerator ad infinitum. 58 This suggests
that property destruction can produce economic gains for its owner. Where
a rational individual or business makes a plausible claim that the
destruction of a valuable asset is wealth or welfare maximizing, limitations
158. Of course, society might well choose to regulate the manner of a refrigerator's
destruction. For example, the law might require the removal of refrigerator doors (to prevent
children from being trapped inside) or regulate the release of ozone-depleting refrigeration
chemicals. As a general matter, such regulations will be socially desirable and do not
impermissibly restrict the owner's right to destroy his property.
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on the destruction of the property seem inappropriate. 159 Exceptions arise
only where the property in question is economically productive and
produces positive externalities sufficient to offset the owner's lost revenue.
If an owner wants to destroy property that generates negligible positive
externalities, he ought to have the right to do so. Surely, such destruction
can constitute resource waste. But because the waste does not harm third
parties substantially, it is tolerable. As long as the owner has an incentive to
preserve valuable property, the transaction costs associated with trying to
monitor and prevent this destruction will far exceed the value of any
resources spared from waste. Hence, the living owner ought to be entitled to
destroy his ordinary furniture, automobile, or vacuum cleaner, so long as
his sanity is unquestioned.
Where a structure retains genuine historical or architectural value and
has been landmarked through the ordinary processes, destruction is plainly
undesirable. If the house has substantial market value but does not produce
substantial positive externalities, by contrast, its owner ought to have the
right to destroy it. The case for permitting the destruction of structures is
weakened to some degree because the transaction costs of monitoring
building destruction are so low. For that reason, it would be appropriate for
the government to condemn the property from the owner and then resell it
to the highest bidder. The sovereign always has this power and can exercise
it to protect a neighborhood's tax base and housing supply. 160 In short,
legislatures, not courts, are the appropriate bodies to prevent the waste
associated with the destruction of structures.
159. There are, of course, instances where people destroy objects that they believe to be
worthless but come to regret the destruction after the fact. For example, middle-aged men
frequently complain that their mothers threw away priceless baseball card collections during
spring cleaning, and the prevalence of such destruction helps account for the rarity, and hence the
value, of certain cards from the 1950s and 1960s. See James Werrell, Op-Ed, Boomers Coping
with Mountains of Clutter, HERALD (Rock Hill, S.C.), July 12, 2002, at 5A. Still, property
destruction exists all around us, and it seems daft to limit or even monitor such destruction in
order to rescue the occasional Mickey Mantle card that might be sitting at the bottom of
someone's trash bin. After all, the owner had a strong economic incentive to discover the
property's value before destroying it, and any ex post regrets about a lost economic opportunity
probably will train him to be more careful in the future.
160. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). Shortly before this Article went to press, the
Supreme Court agreed to hear Kelo v. City of New London, which provides a vehicle for the Court
to reconsider Berman's very deferential approach to legislative exercises of eminent domain. See
843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004), cert. granted, 73 U.S.L.W. 3178 (U.S. Sept. 28, 2004) (No. 04-108).
It is conceivable that the Kelo Court could overreact to abuses of the eminent domain authority,
handing down a broad ruling that will preclude the state from using eminent domain to transfer
valuable property from an owner who has announced plans to destroy it to someone who promises
to preserve it. Let us hope that the Court is careful enough to avoid this pitfall.
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III. DESTRUCTION, DISCOURSE, AND VALUES
It is worth exploring why the organ donation example upsets some
people's intuitions about property destruction. Those who feel disdainful of
Johnston's desire to destroy her home might empathize with her desire to
avoid donating her liver, kidneys, or corneas. Those who are sympathetic to
Johnston's privacy- or sentiment-driven destruction of an unexceptional
house might be angered by the thought that her transplantable organs will
go to waste, contributing to the deaths of innocent third parties. What is
going on here?
The answer does not lie in the comparative values of the underlying
assets. Indeed, the black market value of a young accident victim's organs
may well exceed the market value of all her real and personal assets. Nor
can a completely satisfying answer rely on the prevalence of a
prodestruction norm for organs and an antidestruction norm for houses.
True, the norms here differ, but there seems to be substantial feedback
between the law and social norms, and such analysis merely begs the
question of whether the government should try to undermine inefficient
antidestruction norms.
We can begin to address this puzzle by reflecting on what's missing
from both the Eyerman equation and the organ donation equation. In each
case, the decedent seems to be destroying the asset at issue because of
nonmarket, largely psychological considerations. In the organ donation
case, religion, superstition, and aesthetic considerations may explain why
someone would want his organs to decay upon his death. These
considerations, even if based on ignorance, selfishness, spite, or a refusal to
ponder one's own mortality, are deemed legally sufficient to justify
enormous social waste. In the home destruction case, one supposes that
sentiment, expressive interests, or privacy concerns may have convinced
the homeowner to destroy her home. Yet courts generally deem these
interests insufficient to justify a less substantial waste of resources.
On one view, there is nothing objectionable about courts deferring to
only those destructive decisions that comport with widely shared norms.
Yet if one considers the substantial expressive component of some
decisions to destroy valuable resources, disregarding the idiosyncratic
views that prompt destructive acts becomes more troubling.
This Part examines the expressive characteristics of property
destruction. It suggests that expressive motivations help explain otherwise
puzzling destructive acts and situates the right to destroy within First
Amendment law. It then examines the connection between antidestruction
rules and compelled speech or other forced creative activities. It turns out
that analysis from First Amendment cases and disputes involving forced
procreation undermines the case for broad antidestruction rules.
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A. The Expressive Value of Destruction
In a nation whose colonists famously expressed their desire for
independence by dumping large quantities of perfectly good tea into Boston
Harbor, it hardly should be surprising that property destruction remains a
common and effective means for communicating ideas and grabbing others'
attention. A student of American law will appreciate the expressive
possibilities of property destruction upon realizing that several landmark
First Amendment precedents revolve around the incineration of private
property. 16 1 Because the destruction of a wooden cross, an American flag,
or a draft card conveys an obvious political or social message, courts
contemplating property destruction in the First Amendment context
generally have proved sympathetic to the interests of the destroyers. 162 The
Supreme Court has indicated that to be communicative, an act of
destruction must be more than "mindless nihilism"; rather, the destroyer
must intend "to convey a particularized message," and it must be likely that
the audience for the message would have understood it.
1 63
When it comes to flag or draft card burning, the expressive component
of the destructive act is substantial and the monetary value of the
underlying resource is insubstantial. So, absent concerns about hurt feelings
161. See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 360 (2003) ("[Tlhe burning of a cross is symbolic
expression. The reason why the Klan bums a cross at its rallies, or individuals place a burning
cross on someone else's lawn, is that the burning cross represents the message that the speaker
wishes to communicate. Individuals bum crosses as opposed to other means of communication
because cross burning carries a message in an effective and dramatic manner."); R.A.V. v. City of
St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 380 (1992) (invalidating on First Amendment grounds an ordinance that
barred the display of a burning cross "'which one knows or has reasonable grounds to know
arouses anger, alarm, or resentment on the basis of race, color, creed, religion, or gender"'
(quoting ST. PAUL, MINN. LEGIS. CODE § 292.02 (1990))); Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 406
(1989) (holding that burning an American flag is expressive conduct covered by the First
Amendment); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382 (1968) (upholding the conviction of an
antiwar protester who burned his Selective Service certificate in light of the government's
substantial interest in assuring the continued availability of these certificates).
162. O'Brien is the exception. The Court noted that Selective Service cards were useful in
promoting the smooth administration of the draft process and in promoting communications
between potential draftees and the Selective Service. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-79.
163. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410-11 (1974). The Third Circuit, relying on post-
Spence case law, such as Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, 515
U.S. 557 (1995), has adopted a different test:
[C]onduct is expressive if, considering the nature oft ][the] activity, combined with the
factual context and environment in which it was undertaken, we are led to the
conclusion that the activity was sufficiently imbued with elements of communication to
fall within the scope of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.... [T]his is a fact-
sensitive, context-dependent inquiry, and... the putative speaker bears the burden of
proving that his or her conduct is expressive.
Tenafly Eruv Ass'n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 160-61 (3d Cir. 2002) (third alteration
in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). Most other courts continue to adhere to the Spence
test. Id. at 160 n. 18.
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or weakened symbols, the law ought to privilege the owner's destruction. 164
In a society that tolerates dissent, destruction of this kind of property
appears to be a high-value use.' 65 There are, of course, harder cases. As
Saddam Hussein's control over Baghdad was disintegrating, American
soldiers toppled a large statue of Hussein that had stood in Baghdad's
central square. 166 Because the destruction of the statue apparently
constituted a belligerent attack on a foreign nation's cultural property in the
absence of any military necessity, it seems likely that the statue's
destruction violated international law. 167 American soldiers were destroying
a statue they did not own and had no need to demolish. But let us imagine
that the statue had been toppled by its owner-a legitimate Iraqi
government. In such circumstances, few would bemoan the statue's
destruction. Although the statue surely had some artistic value and perhaps
significant historical value in memorializing a deposed regime, our
concerns about waste would be outweighed by the expressive and symbolic
value associated with this destruction. The destruction of the statue would
be a liberating act, and few would begrudge an Iraqi government's decision
to destroy public property in order to send a particular message. 168
Similar examples abound. Formerly communist nations destroyed many
Lenin statues in the years following the 1989 revolutions. 69 President Bush
called for the destruction of Abu Ghraib prison after the prisoner abuse
164. In Johnson, the defendant burned a flag that had been stolen from its rightful owner,
although Texas did not prosecute him for any crime other than flag desecration. Johnson, 491 U.S.
at 421, 431 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In O'Brien, the government's property interest in the draft
card seemed decisive to the Supreme Court. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 382. I believe the government's
property and administrative interests in the draft cards were overblown and that the case was
wrongly decided. For a persuasive critique along these lines, see John 0. McGinnis, The Once and
Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 49, 96-98 (1996).
165. For a provocative argument in opposition, see Eric Rasmusen, The Economics of
Desecration: Flag Burning and Related Activities, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 245, 253-55 (1998).
166. See R.W. Apple Jr., A High Point in 2 Decades of U.S. Might, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
2003, at Al. A small group of Iraqis evidently had tried to topple the statue with a sledgehammer
prior to the U.S. troops' offer of assistance. Tim Cuprisin, A Statute Topples; What Does It
Mean?, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, April 10, 2003, at 12B.
167. See generally Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Times of Armed
Conflict: The Practice of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 14
HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 6-30 (2001).
168. Joseph Sax recognizes the expressive possibilities of artwork destruction:
[I]t is not surprising that destruction or rejection of art has been a conventional way of
communicating that the message is not, or is no longer, welcome. A pope's wish to
obliterate a work that is seen as promoting impiety is perfectly understandable....
Even today we would not rest easily if the greatest artists of the twentieth century had
made magnificent paintings depicting Hitler or Eichmann.
SAX, supra note 9, at 17.
169. See Marc Fisher, In Berlin, Lenin's Last Stand, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1991, at GI;
Henry Kamm, Icons Are Toppled, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 1991, at 1; David Remnick, The Day
Lenin Fell on His Face, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 1990, at D1.
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scandal there. 7° A Jewish group sunk a boat believed to be Hitler's yacht
off the Florida coast to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the United
States's refusal to accept an ocean liner filled with Jews fleeing the
Nazis. 17 1 A devout Catholic purchased Gustave Courbet's anticlerical
Return from the Conference so that he could destroy it. 172 The Rockefeller
family destroyed a mural that Diego Rivera had painted for Rockefeller
Center after the artist refused to remove Lenin's image from the painting.
173
Lady Churchill smashed and then instructed an employee to burn a portrait
by an important artist that Parliament had presented to her husband in
1954.174 The Churchills hated the portrait, which they believed depicted
Winston as a "gross and cruel monster,"1 75 and on at least one account Lady
Churchill destroyed the portrait to provide Winston "peace of mind."'
17 6
People regularly bum mementos from romantic relationships that have
ended as a way of marking the relationship's permanent cessation.1
77
Various religious groups have challenged government restrictions on the
demolition and renovation of their places of worship, citing the Free
Exercise Clause. 78 And, as mentioned at the outset of this Article, the
Harry Caray's restaurant chain publicly destroyed a historically significant
baseball with a market value in excess of $100,000.179
Now consider a much more disconcerting incident of expressive
destruction-the Taliban's destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan despite
outcry from foreign governments and offers from museums to purchase
some of the works. 180 This destruction had an obvious religious motivation
and meaning. These were not irrational acts of destruction; they were
170. Remarks at the United States Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 40 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. DOc. 944, 947-48 (May 24, 2004).
171. Associated Press, Sunk as Holocaust Symbol, Hitler Yacht Poses Problem, L.A. TIMES,
June 13, 1989, at A2. Due to a crew member's mistake, the yacht was sunk in the middle of a
shallow shipping lane and had to be moved. Id.
172. SAX, supra note 9, at 19.
173. Id. at 13-16.
174. Id. at 37.
175. Id. at 38 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Id. at 39 (internal quotation marks omitted).
177. See Laurel Richardson, Secrecy and Status: The Social Construction of Forbidden
Relationships, 53 AM. SOC. REv. 209, 215 (1988). In Titanic, currently the highest-grossing film
ever, the elderly protagonist melodramatically tosses the priceless "Heart of the Ocean" necklace
into the Atlantic, evidently as a tribute to her deceased lover. TITANIC (Paramount Pictures & 20th
Century Fox 1997).
178. See, e.g., Rector of St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York, 914 F.2d 348 (2d
Cir. 1990); Keeler v. Mayor of Cumberland, 940 F. Supp. 879 (D. Md. 1996). California has
exempted religious organizations from the burdens of its historic preservation laws for
noncommercial property, evidently because of these concerns. This exemption has survived an
Establishment Clause challenge. See E. Bay Asian Local Dev. Co. v. State, 13 P.3d 1122 (Cal.
2000).
179. See supra text accompanying note 5.
180. See Agence France-Presse, Pre-Islam Idols Being Broken Under Decree by Afghans,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2001, at A9.
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rational acts that conveyed unmistakable and attention-getting messages.
The fact that the cash-strapped Taliban spumed purchase offers from
foreigners shows how much it valued the expressive opportunity. And yet,
the same act of expression can be cast as an abhorrent, spiteful act. Still,
given property destruction's expressive value, barring messages deemed
hostile to a person or group is potentially problematic. 1
81
In all these cases, the destruction of valuable property had a substantial
expressive component. Humans are fascinated and intrigued when someone
destroys a valuable commodity-the more valuable the resource, the more
attention the destruction draws. Yet there is something unsettling about the
nature of the expression here. Tearing down or obliterating a statue sends a
powerful message that the destroyer disagrees with the symbolic expression
manifested in the work. 182 But the destructive act is unlikely to contribute to
a healthy public discourse or point society toward truth. How is a painter to
respond to someone who has set his still life ablaze? Asking him to create a
new painting from scratch, as a response to the destroyer's "artistic
criticism," is asking quite a lot.
Under a collectivist reading of the First Amendment, then, the
government could regulate destructive acts.' 83 Destroying a unique,
irreplaceable' 84 piece of property is, in some ways, closer to heckling a
speaker than to responding to what he has to say. It also may deter others
from devoting the necessary time and resources to future creative
activities.185 So the law might differentiate between A, who gives a speech,
and B, whose contribution to the debate is to ensure that no record of A's
speech survives. All the government is doing by privileging creation over
181. None of this suggests that the government cannot properly penalize those whose
expressive conduct causes tangible harm to others that is unrelated to their sentiments concerning
the expression itself. John Wilkes Booth's yelling "Sic semper tyrannisf' ("Thus always to
tyrants!") upon assassinating Lincoln hardly rendered the assassination protected conduct. Nor is
the performance artist who burns down his house immune from liability if the fire spreads to a
neighboring lot.
182. See Jeffrey Zaslow, In Detroit, a Blow to 'the Fist' Touches a Sensitive Nerve, WALL
ST. J., Mar. 4, 2004, at Al (describing several instances of expressive attacks on statues). See
generally Vera Zlatarski, "Moral" Rights and Other Moral Interests: Public Art Law in France,
Russia, and the United States, 23 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 201, 232-34 (1999) (discussing the
conflicting values implicated by public art and its criticism).
183. For free speech scholarship in the collectivist tradition, see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE PEOPLE (1948); Harry Kalven, Jr.,
The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3, 23-25; and Cass R.
Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255 (1992). For a critique of these collectivist
understandings of the First Amendment, see Robert Post, Meiklejohn's Mistake: Individual
Autonomy and the Reform of Public Discourse, 64 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1993).
184. In explaining the reason why society regards a great painting as an object that should not
be broken apart, we might point to the piece's irreplaceable nature. See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,
Objectification, in SEX & SOCIAL JUSTICE 213, 218-21 (1999).
185. Cf Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court and the Problem of Hate Speech, 24 CAP. U. L.
REV. 281, 287-90 (1995) (justifying hate speech restrictions on the grounds that in the absence of
such restrictions, minority groups will be deterred from participating in public debate).
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destruction is establishing a procedural rule that the artist who intends to
make a lasting aesthetic contribution cannot have her speech cut off without
her consent. If the First Amendment is about the nation's commitment to
producing a public debate that is "uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,"'
' 86
then the law might well view the symbolic destruction of irreplaceable
property as low-value speech that can be restricted in order to facilitate the
success of a deliberative process.
Federal regulation of art destruction, probably unwittingly, has
reinforced these collectivist themes. In 1990, Congress enacted the Visual
Artists Rights Act (VARA). 187 Among other things, the law prohibits the
destruction of visual art that is "of recognized stature" during an artist's
lifetime. 88 Artists can waive their VARA rights contractually,189 but the
artist cannot transfer her VARA rights to a third party.'
90
Taken together, VARA's antidestruction provisions likely contribute to
a robust public debate within the artistic community. VARA says that when
an artist has made a substantial artistic contribution (by creating a work of
recognized stature), it is inappropriate for an owner to destroy that work,
even if he does so for expressive purposes, unless the artist consents to the
destruction in writing. VARA thus recognizes that when an artist creates an
important work of art, she generally intends to make a lasting contribution
to aesthetic discourse. During the artist's life, the work can be criticized or
parodied, but it cannot be destroyed unless the artist consents. This regime
is consistent with the collectivist conception of the First Amendment-both
creation and destruction convey messages and therefore have some value,
but creation generally is more socially valuable than destruction, because
creation contributes an idea whereas destruction of unique property
attempts to wipe out an existing idea. 91 For most works of art, creation also
186. N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). For an argument that promoting
such debate is a central goal of the First Amendment, see OWEN M. FIss, THE IRONY OF FREE
SPEECH 22-25 (1996).
187. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 5089, 5128-33
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.). For an illuminating discussion of VARA's effects,
see William M. Landes, What Has the Visual Artist's Rights Act of 1990 Accomplished?, 25 J.
CULTURAL EcON. 283 (2001).
188. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3)(B) (2000); see also Martin v. City of Indianapolis, 192 F.3d
608, 612 (7th Cir. 1999); Robert J. Sherman, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: American
Artists Burned Again, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 373, 426 n.320 (1995).
189. Landes, supra note 187, at 286.
190. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(e)(1).
191. Eric Rasmusen makes a related point:
Desecration, while sometimes meant to convey an idea, has simple speech as a
substitute. Saying that I am opposed to the Vietnam War may not be as effective as if I
burnt a flag and then made my statement, but the content is the same. The idea can still
be expressed, even if I cannot get as much attention as if I burnt a flag, tortured a kitten,
spent money to buy television coverage, or were allowed to subpoena listeners. The
marginal social return from increasing the number of ways in which ideas can be
communicated is decreasing, so a comparison of the costs and benefits naturally leads
to some ways being allowed and some prohibited.
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will be far more time-consuming than destruction. After the artist has died,
there is little expressive interest to be balanced against the living
destroyer's expressive interest, and, in the case of works exhibited well
before the artist's demise, the idea in question already has been voiced for a
substantial period of time, so destruction may be justified on collectivist
grounds.'
92
VARA rights to prevent destruction remain with the artist, unless
waived, because it is the artist's speech at issue.193 Critics who have argued
that VARA is unconstitutional have ascribed equal value to the creation and
the destruction of artwork or focused primarily on the restrictions that
VARA imposes on owners who wish to destroy art for expressive
purposes, 194 but a collectivist framework shows how the statute might be
reconciled with First Amendment principles.
Those who harbor individual-autonomy-oriented views of the First
Amendment will have a more difficult time countenancing restrictions on
property destruction that may have expressive consequences. 195 From an
individual rights perspective, it is difficult to see why Lady Churchill's
right to destroy a portrait she and her husband detest shouldn't be given as
much protection as the artist's right to have his portrait preserved. Indeed,
from this perspective, the destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan seems
completely uncontroversial-the artists and workers who created these
statues are long dead and presumably lack any posthumous expressive
Rasmusen, supra note 165, at 259.
192. There will be an interest in permitting the public to hear the dead artist's speech. See
Dana R. Wagner, Case Note, The First Amendment and the Right To Hear, 108 YALE L.J. 669
(1998). But visual art, like other copyrighted expression, typically has the greatest impact on
artistic discourse in the months or years following its initial public display.
193. VARA's default rule could be socially efficient if artists cared about preventing
destruction but did not care enough about destruction to warrant the costs of formalizing
antidestruction agreements. Indeed, contracts involving the sale of art are usually unwritten and
often informal. Marina Santilli, United States' Moral Rights Developments in European
Perspective, 1 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 89, 105-06 (1997). If most art purchasers do not
place much value on the right to destroy artwork, VARA's antidestruction default rule might
impose contractual provisions that the parties would have agreed to had transaction costs not
deterred the formalization of a complete contract. That said, there are reasons to be skeptical about
these empirical claims. See Landes, supra note 187, at 288-89, 300-01. So VARA might be easier
to support on free speech grounds than on economic efficiency grounds.
194. See, e.g., Joseph Z. Fleming, Materials on the Representation of Artists: Leviton v.
Hollywood Art & Culture Center, Inc. (No. 97-7175 Civ.), SF39 A.L.I.-A.B.A. 859, 869-70
(2001); Kathryn A. Kelly, Moral Rights and the First Amendment: Putting Honor Before Free
Speech?, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV. 211, 242-50 (1994); Eric E. Bensen, Note, The
Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990: Why Moral Rights Cannot Be Protected Under the United
States Constitution, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1127, 1139-40 (1996).
195. For a helpful review of some of this literature and a comparison to the work of modem
collectivist theorists, see Christopher S. Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific
Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J. 245, 311-24 (2003).
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interests, but the Taliban that ordered their destruction had cognizable
expressive interests. 196
Regardless of one's animating theory of expressive conduct, there is a
real danger of leakage here. If the law must defer to expressive property
destruction but not to economically motivated or spite-motivated property
destruction, then sophisticated property owners who are motivated by
economic interests will claim to be motivated by expressive interests.
Courts may have a difficult time discerning owners' actual motivations, and
errors will be inevitable. Indeed, instances like the Buddhas of Bamiyan
destruction show that spiteful acts can be spiteful expressions too. This is a
substantial problem, and one that points in favor of a relatively unified
treatment of the right to destroy.
B. If I Made It, Can I Destroy It?
Does a creator have more leeway to destroy a piece of property than an
ordinary owner who acquires the property via purchase, inheritance, or gift?
Joseph Sax says yes, at least in the case of works of art, because an "artist
should be entitled to decide how the world will remember him or her."',97 I
agree with his bottom line, though I will elaborate on the justifications for
this conclusion.
Creators often attempt to destroy their property. This Article already
has discussed the widespread destruction of private papers by various
American presidents. We find an analog to this destructive intent among
great writers and artists. Franz Kafka famously decided to have his
unpublished manuscripts, letters, and diaries destroyed while he was in a
sanitarium, dying of tuberculosis. To that end, he wrote his executor and
friend, Max Brod, two separate notes directing him to bum, unread, all of
Kafka's writings immediately. 98 In addition to these notes, Kafka verbally
196. If the destruction of the Buddhas amounted to "fighting words" or a "true threat," then
some individual-liberty-oriented First Amendment scholars might favor restricting their
destruction. For a discussion, see G. Robert Blakey & Brian J. Murray, Threats, Free Speech, and
the Jurisprudence of the Federal Criminal Law, 2002 BYU L. REv. 829, 936-37.
197. SAx, supra note 9, at 200. Sax would not favor according public figures who create
historical documents the same rights, but he recognizes the practical limitations associated with
holding government officials to formal antidestruction rules:
[P]ublic figures-including our Supreme Court justices-should be strongly
discouraged from destroying working papers, even though we may continue to
recognize private ownership in them.... The Supreme Court could help by articulating
nonbinding guidelines that acknowledged the importance of historical knowledge, and
sought to draw some line (in time) to accommodate the competing demands of
confidentiality and of public understanding of its judiciary.
Id. at 200-01.
198. Paul Kurt Ackerman, A History of Critical Writing on Franz Kaka, 23 GERMAN Q. 105,
105 (1950).
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directed Brod to destroy his written works.1 99 Included in the materials
Kafka asked Brod to destroy were the only copies of his two then-
unpublished masterpieces, The Castle and The Trial. Brod "did not honor
his friend's last wish., 20 0 Instead, he edited and published Kafka's novels,
short stories, diaries, and other writings.
Kafka's dying wishes of artistic destruction were not unusual. The
author Jacqueline Susann similarly directed her executor to bum her diary
upon her passing. The diary had been valued at $3.8 million.2 ' Virgil
evidently wanted the Aeneid burned upon his death, but he appears to have
changed his mind after friends convinced him that Augustus would never
allow such destruction.20 2 In 1954, at the age of twenty-four, an obscure
artist decided to destroy all the paintings he had previously executed, as a
way of "beginning afresh with a blank canvas., 20 3 Within a few years, that
artist, Jasper Johns, would produce a world-famous painting of the
American flag and become one of the most talked-about artists of his era.2 °4
More recently, Brett Weston, a well-known photographer, publicly
199. Douglas E. Litowitz, Franz Kalka's Outsider Jurisprudence, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY
103, 115 (2002). There is a debate concerning Kafka's sincerity. Litowitz suggests that when
Kafka verbally instructed Brod to destroy the unpublished works, Brod refused, so Kafka must
have understood that Brod would not destroy the writings after Kafka's death. See id. Brod
himself suggested that he did not know whether Kafka was being sincere but that he thought
Kafka understood he never would have destroyed Kafka's works even if he had known that Kafka
steadfastly wished their destruction. See Max Brod, Postscript to the First Edition (1925) of Franz
Kajka's The Trial, in WILLIAM R. BISHIN & CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, LAW, LANGUAGE AND
ETHICS: AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL METHOD 1, 3 (1972). That said, a dying Kafka
did bum many of the manuscripts to which he had access, a fact Brod found lamentable. Id. at 4.
Had he not been confined to a tuberculosis sanitarium during most of the final years of his life,
Kafka might have had the opportunity to bum the other works as well.
It does not appear that Brod's doubts over Kafka's true intentions made any difference. Brod
candidly admitted that he would not have destroyed the writings even if he had known that Kafka
adamantly wished to see them destroyed:
My decision ... rest[s] ... solely on the fact that Kafka's unpublished work contains
the most wonderful treasures, and, measured against his own work, the best things he
has written. In all honesty I must confess that this one fact of the literary and ethical
value of what I am publishing would have been enough to decide me to do so,
definitely, finally, and irresistibly, even if I had had no single objection to raise against
the validity of Kafka's last wishes.
Id.
200. Ackerman, supra note 198, at 105.
201. Sykas, supra note 33, at 926.
202. Id. at 919. Accounts of this story differ. According to a leading Virgil scholar, "[O]n
leaving Italy for Greece, [Virgil] had instructed Varius to bum the Aeneid 'if anything should
happen to him[.'] On his death bed, he seems to have wavered a little: he asked for the manuscript
in order to bum it, yet he did not insist when no one complied with his request." BROOKS OTIS,
VIRGIL: A STUDY IN CIVILIZED POETRY 1 (1964). On another account, Virgil did leave
instructions to destroy the Aeneid, but "Emperor Augustus ordered the executors to disregard the
order." JESSE DUKEMINIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 33 (6th ed.
2000).
203. Louis Menand, Capture the Flag, SLATE, Oct. 30, 1996, http://slate.msn.com/id/2905.
204. Id.
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incinerated a lifetime's worth of valuable negatives to commemorate his
eightieth birthday. °5
Suppose the Kafka case, or something like it, had been litigated. Let us
imagine a modem-day American Kafka, who we'll call K, and a will that is
being probated. Say the will contains unambiguous instructions for Brod to
destroy all copies of K's unwritten work. And yet Brod approaches the
court seeking direction. Brod argues that the texts have great literary and
commercial value and that to destroy them would constitute an
unconscionable waste. What should a court do? Richard Posner states that
these types of cases arise commonly and that courts typically would strike
the direction to destroy the papers on public policy grounds.2 °6 Assume our
hypothetical court embraces this approach and directs Brod to publish the
valuable K works, with the proceeds to be distributed among K's named
beneficiaries. Is this the right result? I submit that the K papers and
manuscripts should be destroyed, on the basis of any of four rationales.
First, we might reiterate the ex ante argument. A society that does not
allow authors to have their draft works destroyed posthumously could have
less literary product than a society that requires the preservation of all
literary works not destroyed during the author's life. Protecting authors'
rights to destroy should encourage high-risk, high-reward projects, and
might prevent writers from worrying that they should not commit words to
paper unless they have complete visions of the narrative structures for their
work.2°7 Indeed, the society that respects the dead author's wish for his
unfinished writings to be burned avoids putting the ailing artist in the
terrible position of having to bum unfinished works that might be
completed if he recovers.20 8 In the past, great artists have erred on the side
of destruction out of fear that their unfinished works would tarnish their
reputations. °9
205. See infra note 212.
206. POSNER, supra note 150, at 559. In Denmark, by contrast, the law appears to defer to the
testator who wishes to destroy his unpublished writings. See Susanne Storm & Hans Viggo Godsk
Pedersen, Denmark, in 1 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF LAWS: FAMILY AND SUCCESSION
LAW 1, 160 (W. Pintens ed., 1998) ("A condition within a will is invalid if it demands a use or
destruction of parts of the estate and this condition has no reasonable meaning. .... The testator
must be given a large degree of freedom to decide, for example, whether or not letters and certain
personal effects should be destroyed and to support certain causes even though these may not be
normally considered appropriate.").
207. As in Continental Paper Bag, there is a possibility that K would have produced the
writings even if he had known he would not be able to destroy them in the future.
208. See Richard A. Epstein, Justice Across the Generations, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1465, 1488
n.43 (1989).
209. Joseph Sax offers an illuminating anecdote:
Georges Rouault, in the presence of a photographer, threw into a furnace some 315 of
his own canvases .... Rouault's act was explained by his daughter: "Conscientious as
he was, what worried him was not doubt that he would not be able to finish a particular
canvas to his satisfaction, but fear lest he would never have the time to do so. His
principal concern in making the painful choice ... was the stage of progress of each
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 114:781
2005] The Right To Destroy 833
Second, we might accept an economic rationale. K is in the best
position to determine which of his works should form his artistic legacy. K
has an economic interest (via his concern for the welfare of his
beneficiaries) in assuring that the value of his published works is not
diminished by the conceivably inferior quality of the unpublished works.
After all, the law does not force Hugo Boss to ship its irregular or
substandard clothing to discount sellers. Rather, it lets Hugo Boss opt for a
reputation as a maker of high-status, invariably high-quality garments. By
the same token, the court should defer to K's judgment about what actions
will maximize the value of his estate. 21 Because K's heirs would have the
same economic interest in the value of his collective works, they should
have the same opportunity to destroy works that might diminish his
211
reputation.
Third and relatedly, we might shoehorn K's wishes into the types of
expressive theories so far discussed. By destroying his unfinished works, K
may wish to send a message to the public that he is not the type of artist
who will tolerate, let alone publish, inferior works.21 2 A dramatic
destruction of K's unfinished works certainly would garner the public's
attention. Brod's publicized destruction of the work that had taken so much
of K's time perhaps would rekindle public interest in those few works that
K thought were worthy of publication.
Finally, there is another expressive component to K's destruction, and it
deviates substantially from the expressive theories previously explored. If a
court decides to bar Brod from destroying K's unpublished works, it is
forcing the departed K to speak when he would have preferred to remain
silent. From a First Amendment perspective, a judicial remedy barring the
destruction of literary documents would be problematic if it occurred during
painting. Thus it was only after long hesitation, and not without great anxiety, that
Rouault decided to burn those works which he felt so little advanced that completion
would demand too long a time."
SAX, supra note 9, at 43 (second omission in original).
210. The fact that K has directed the destruction of these papers by will, as opposed to
destroying them himself, should not make a difference. While he was alive, K had an opportunity
to improve the written works. Accordingly, it may have been perfectly rational to hold on to them
in the hopes that he would recover and complete them, while expecting that Brod would destroy
them if they were not perfected by the end of K's life.
211. Cf SAX, supra note 9, at 146 (describing the destruction of 550 Robert Henri paintings
by his heir in order to increase the value of the approximately 3450 remaining works).
212. In 1991, Brett Weston burned "all but 12 of the thousands of negatives he had produced
since his youth," which prompted the Los Angeles Times to speculate on whether this destruction
would "enhance Weston's status by controlling the quality of his work." Suzanne Muchnic, A
Bonfire of the Vanities? Admirers of Brett Weston Question Why He Destroyed a Lifetime's Worth
of Negatives, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1991, at Fl. Weston had long provided in his will that his
negatives were to be burned upon his death, and he had publicly promised that he would carry out
the destruction himself if he lived to eighty. Id. Evidently, Weston was partly concerned with the
possibility that others might use his negatives to make posthumous prints of his work that would
not reflect his artistry.
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K's life.21 3 This may be particularly problematic in the context of a
controversial or envelope-pushing work. K may have concluded that he
only was willing to publish his novel if he could be around to defend it
against the inevitable but unpredictable literary criticism that its publication
would provoke.
K's death probably would obviate the possibility of a constitutional
violation,21 4 but the state's action of forcing a dead person to share his
private written words still seems to run afoul of the principles underlying
the First Amendment right to remain silent.215 The line of First Amendment
cases barring compelled speech sounds in the individual-autonomy-oriented
conception of speech. Permitting someone to bar the publication of his own
unspoken words enhances expressive liberty without destroying the
expression of someone who wished to be heard. From this perspective,
destruction of an expressive work by its creator is very different from
destruction of a creative work by anyone else.
213. Exceptions would arise, of course, if the papers were valuable for evidentiary or law
enforcement purposes.
214. We know that people contemplating death value postmortem opportunities to express
themselves. See Ciran Giles, Spanish Internet Site Offers Clients After-Death E-Mail Service,
CANADIAN PRESS, Sept. 25, 2004, 2004 WL 93701112 (describing a website that charges
customers a fee and, in exchange, agrees to send e-mails to the customers' loved ones, written by
the customer, after the customer's death). At the same time, dead people presumably have no First
Amendment rights. What about testators? They were alive when they engaged in the
communications at issue. Many of us would recoil if the government began censoring epithets that
people wanted placed on their own tombstones. Say that A contracted with a cemetery to have his
tombstone read: "Loyal Husband, Die-Hard Mariners Fan, and Committed Anarchist." Assume
that the government is hostile to anarchism and that all of A's heirs view A's ideological affiliation
as an embarrassment. Could the government really direct the cemetery to strike the partisan
affiliation from the tombstone text without running afoul of the First Amendment? Our instincts
suggest not. Alternatively, if the courts were to squelch testators' expressive conduct, one might
conceptualize such an act as an infringement of a living person's speech, with the cause of action
descending to the speaker's heirs. Of course, in some cases, the descent of this cause of action will
complicate matters, because the heirs will be attempting to prevent the destruction of property at
issue.
215. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (invalidating on First Amendment
grounds a state law barring motorists from obscuring the New Hampshire state motto printed on
their vehicle license plates); W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Bamette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)
(invalidating on First Amendment grounds a school regulation requiring public school students to
recite a pledge and salute the American flag). French law accomplishes the same objective by
recognizing a "right of disclosure," which is an artist's right to decide when a work is complete.
This right of disclosure necessarily protects the artist's ability to destroy a work prior to
completion. Henry Hansmann & Marina Santilli, Authors' and Artists' Moral Rights: A
Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95, 136-37 (1997).
Note the tension that results from alternative free speech theories. Compelled speech is
anathema to individual autonomy conceptions of the First Amendment, but First Amendment
collectivists may be sympathetic to compelled speech when the resulting expression adds
something important to the public discourse. See supra notes 182-186 and accompanying text. Of
course, a First Amendment collectivist still would be concerned about compelled speech if it
deterred other potential speakers from committing their private words and thoughts to paper. See
supra notes 207-209 and accompanying text.
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There are, in short, strong reasons to defer to the destructive wishes of
those who have created cultural property, particularly when that property
has not been published or publicly displayed. As long as the creator
possesses testamentary capacity, deferring to destructive wishes in a will is
appropriate.
C. Biological Exceptionalism?
In an analogous set of cases, courts have recognized the problem of
forced creative activity and have come down squarely on the side of the
right to destroy. Indeed, the procreative context has seen perhaps the
greatest degree of judicial deference to an individual's right to destroy.
These decisions are in many respects remarkable and reveal an alternative
way for courts to balance the individual's right to destroy property against
society's "collectivist" interest in avoiding the waste of scarce resources.
In the past decade or so, several state supreme courts have been called
upon to resolve disputes among divorcees concerning the disposition of
cryogenically frozen embryos. The first published case on this subject in the
United States was Davis v. Davis, a 1992 decision by the Tennessee
Supreme Court.216 Mary Sue Davis and Junior Davis were a married couple
who were unable to conceive a child naturally. The couple then tried in
vitro fertilization. Ova were removed from Mary Sue and fertilized with
Junior's sperm in a petri dish, and then some of them were transferred back
into Mary Sue's uterus for implantation. The remaining fertilized embryos
were frozen cryogenically for subsequent implantation.217 The couple's
initial efforts to conceive were unsuccessful, and Junior filed for divorce in
February 1989.218
Junior and Mary Sue agreed on all terms of the dissolution, save one:
custody of the remaining frozen embryos. 219 Mary Sue wanted to donate the
embryos to a childless couple, and Junior wanted the embryos to be
destroyed.220 The trial court held the interest in preserving the embryos'
viability to be paramount and directed that Mary Sue receive custody of the
embryos so as to ensure that the potential children be given a chance to
survive through implantation.22' It handed down, in essence, an Eyerman-
like antiwaste decision. The court of appeals reversed, holding that Junior
Davis had a constitutional right to avoid fatherhood in this circumstance. 2
22
216. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).
217. Id. at 591-92.
218. Id. at 592.
219. Id. at 589.
220. Id. at 590.
221. Id. at 589.
222. Id.
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The Tennessee Supreme Court then sought to balance Mary Sue's
interest in avoiding destruction of the embryos and in "knowing that the
lengthy... procedures she underwent were [not] futile ' 223 against Junior's
interest in avoiding "unwanted parenthood... with all of its possible
financial and psychological consequences., 224 The court ultimately held
that Junior's interest in avoiding parenthood trumped Mary Sue's interest in
seeing the embryos preserved and, more generally, that "[o]rdinarily, the
party wishing to avoid procreation should prevail, assuming that the other
party has a reasonable possibility of achieving parenthood by [other]
means." 225 A number of other courts have been called upon to resolve
similar conflicts, and in most instances the courts have sided with the party
seeking to destroy the embryo. 26 In none of the cases did the court force
someone to become a parent without that person's consent.
The cases considering the destruction of preembryos are particularly
challenging because there are weighty societal interests on both sides of the
issue. Recall the facts of Davis. Mary Sue wanted to donate the fertilized
embryos to a childless couple, and Junior wanted them destroyed. Mary Sue
had a strong interest in preventing the destruction of her potential progeny,
but Junior had a strong interest in avoiding unwanted fatherhood. As in the
organ donation cases, society had a powerful interest in permitting the
embryos' transfer to a couple that was otherwise unable to conceive.
Finally, a prodestruction or antidestruction ruling would have important ex
ante effects. In cases where a sperm donor and an egg donor might disagree
about the disposition of the embryo, either rule could change the way in
which eggs are extracted from the mother or prompt marginal parties to
forgo the in vitro fertilization process altogether. Indeed, given the nature of
223. Id. at 604.
224. Id. at 603.
225. Id. at 604.
226. See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-58 (Mass. 2000) ("[W]e conclude that,
even had the husband and the wife entered into an unambiguous agreement between themselves
regarding the disposition of the frozen preembryos, we would not enforce an agreement that
would compel one donor to become a parent against his or her will. As a matter of public policy,
we conclude that forced procreation is not an area amenable to judicial enforcement. It is well-
established that courts will not enforce contracts that violate public policy." (footnote omitted));
J.B. v. M.B., 783 A.2d 707, 719 (N.J. 2001) ("The public policy concerns that underlie limitations
on contracts involving family relationships are protected by permitting either party to object at a
later date to provisions specifying a disposition of preembryos that that party no longer
accepts.... [O]rdinarily the party choosing not to become a biological parent will prevail .... );
Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 271 (Wash. 2002) (directing the thawing of frozen embryos and
prohibiting their further development). But cf Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 590 (App. Div.
1997) (holding the parties to their written agreement executed at the time of the procedure, which
provided that the fertilized embryos would be used for scientific research by a fertility center).
Because the embryo cases are so close and contentious, New York's approach in Kass seems
to be the best solution-parties shall be required to agree at the time of the procedure upon the
disposition of the fertilized embryos in the event that one party no longer desires implantation,
and any such agreement will be enforced.
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the fertilization process, courts cannot fall back on the general rule
regarding such disputes, which is that the wishes of the potential mother
trump the conflicting wishes of the potential father.227
The courts' treatment of the embryo cases might help us understand the
expressive nature of destruction. Reading Davis and the other procreation
cases, one is struck by the variations between those opinions and other
opinions involving the right to destroy other kinds of property. The right to
destroy frozen embryos is deemed a paramount right because of its linkage
to a constitutional privacy right to avoid procreating. In none of the cases
does the appellate court place any weight on society's interest in avoiding
the destruction of a human preembryo. Indeed, there is no discussion of the
various childless couples who could benefit from embryo donation, and
Davis went so far as to say that a mother who wanted to have an embryo
implanted in her own uterus would have a stronger claim than a parent who
wanted to donate an embryo to an infertile couple.228 The libertarian tone of
these opinions is unmistakable, and the courts' concern for the interests of
third parties (including the frozen potential human life, infertile couples,
and research scientists) is nonexistent.
Consider the implications of this analysis for the questions surrounding
the posthumous publication of K's manuscripts. The embryo destruction
cases suggest that the constitutional right not to procreate trumps society's
right to use an embryo for reproductive or scientific purposes. By the same
token, one might argue that the writer's right to avoid speaking (i.e., to
direct the destruction of his unpublished works) ought to trump any societal
interest in disseminating artistic speech.
In cases where the state is called upon to decide whether a document
should be published against the author's will, there may be good reasons to
defer to the author's choice, even if the result is the incineration of the only
surviving copies of The Castle and The Trial. That said, both lines of
authority seem to ignore something important: In the posthumous
publication cases, the artist's privacy and perhaps even his expressive
interests have to be balanced against the social value that might result from
publication. In the procreation cases, the interests of people who wish to
avoid biological parenthood ought to be balanced against the interests of an
227. Courts generally will not force a prospective mother to have an abortion at the father's
request, nor will they prevent a woman from having an abortion if her partner wants the fetus
carried to term. See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Custody and Couvade: The Importance of
Paternal Bonding in the Law of Family Relations, 33 IND. L. REv. 691, 717-25 (2000) (discussing
the Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to a prospective father's right to prevent an
abortion). These rules have been justified on the basis of the disparate costs that pregnancy (and
often child rearing) impose on mothers.
228. Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 604.
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infertile couple that would like to conceive children using an already
fertilized embryo.229
IV. DISFAVORED TREATMENT FOR TESTAMENTARY DESTRUCTION
Several of the cases discussed in Parts II and III of this Article involve
testamentary destruction, a topic that, by itself, deserves sustained attention.
As a general matter, the law recoils at the idea of allowing the dead hand to
destroy property. In this Part, I argue that the law's reluctance to permit
testamentary destruction is worth rethinking.
My defense of testamentary destruction may prompt resistance from
many readers. Whatever one thinks about the right of a living person to
destroy her property, it is harder, instinctively, to develop sympathy for the
owner who wishes to destroy her property via will. The interests of the dead
generally do not count in a utilitarian calculus, except insofar as individuals
worry about what happens to them after they die and take actions during
life to safeguard their graves, legacies, or descendants' welfare. Yet most of
the litigated right-to-destroy cases arise in the probate context, and the law
generally gives the living owner much greater power to destroy property
than the dead owner.230
A legal rule that empowers living destroyers and disempowers
testamentary destroyers can be circumvented quite easily. Clever estate
attorneys could satisfy a testator's destructive wishes by creating
SmashCorp, a firm whose business model would consist of destroying any
property it received in exchange for a small fee. The testator could then, by
contract, trust, or perhaps even will,23' transfer all to-be-destroyed property
to SmashCorp, secure in the knowledge that her wishes would be carried
out by the company's demolition experts. The ease of circumventing the
prevailing rule raises questions about the reasons for its persistence. Even
setting aside these pragmatic concerns about circumvention, however, a
regime that gives dead people no power to destroy their property will
influence, perhaps for the worse, living souls contemplating their own
demise. And the law's resistance to dead hand destruction pushes against
the grain of American trusts and estates law, which is for the most part
229. The issue of posthumous procreation rights has already arisen in the courts. See Hecht v.
Superior Court, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275 (Ct. App. 1993); Michael K. Elliot, Tales of Parenthood
from the Crypt: The Predicament of the Posthumously Conceived Child, 39 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J. 47, 54-67 (2004).
230. There are isolated exceptions. For example, while a testator can direct the destruction of
his heart via will, a living person cannot lawfully destroy his own heart.
231. For a discussion of how wills have been displaced as the instrument of choice for
gratuitous wealth transfers, see John H. Langbein, The Nonprobate Revolution and the Future of
the Law of Succession, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1108 (1984).
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relatively deferential to the wishes of testators and settlors regarding the
disposition of their property.232
A. Why a Testator Has a Stake in Destroyed Property
There is one justification for restricting the rights of people to destroy
their property via will that emerges repeatedly in the literature and case law.
The third edition of Jesse Dukeminier and Stanley Johanson's leading
casebook on trusts and estates sets forth the argument:
The law gives a living person much more power over his
property than it gives a dead person.... [D]uring life a person
personally suffers the economic consequences, which is a deterrent
to foolish decisions ordering property destroyed. If a person
destroys his property during life, the person usually assumes this
act will make him better off. And society assumes that the totality
of individual choices of this kind will maximize society's wealth.
Ordering property destroyed after death imposes no economic
consequences upon the testator, who is dead; the testator's
decision, which is not effective until death, does not (and cannot)
take into account pecuniary loss suffered by the decision-maker.
The inhibiting effect of immediate economic loss does not affect a
direction in a will to destroy property. Hence a court will ordinarily
order property destroyed only if there is a convincing
justification. 33
On this account, we only defer to the person who is willing to put her
money where her mouth is by destroying property while she might
otherwise live to enjoy it. Courts deciding right-to-destroy cases such as
Eyerman and In re Will of Pace have adopted reasoning substantially
similar to Dukeminier and Johanson 's, 234 even as subsequent editions of
their casebook softened the claims made in the third edition.235
232. See, e.g., Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV.
621, 657-66, 674-77 (2004).
233. JESSE DUKEM1NIER & STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 22-23
(3d ed. 1984) (emphasis added). But cf SHAVELL, supra note 115, at 68-70 (arguing that an
owner implicitly takes into account the private loss resulting from imposing dead hand restrictions
on his property).
234. Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 215 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975) ("While
living, a person may manage, use or dispose of his money or property with fewer restraints than a
decedent by will. One is generally restrained from wasteful expenditure or destructive inclinations
by the natural desire to enjoy his property or to accumulate it during his lifetime. Such
considerations however have not tempered the extravagance or eccentricity of the testamentary
disposition here on which there is no check except the courts."); In re Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d
488, 492 (Sur. Ct. 1977) (quoting extensively from Eyerman with approval).
235. DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supra note 202, at 33 ("A person can, if she wishes, destroy
her property during life (unless it is subject to historic preservation or similar laws), but she
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I believe that Dukeminier and Johanson's analysis of posthumous
destruction misses the mark. I will use the facts of the Eyerman case to
explain why. Recall that Eyerman involved Johnston's will provision
directing that her house be razed. Dukeminier and Johanson are obviously
correct that upon Johnston's death, she had no incentive to preserve the
house. But she presumably did not draft her will on her deathbed.236 On
some earlier date, when she did create her will, Johnston knew she wanted
to spend the remainder of her life living in her home. She faced a choice
about what to do with the remainder interest in her home. If she wanted, she
could have retained a life estate in her home and sold the remainder interest
to a third party for a substantial sum of money.237 She then could have used
that money immediately to improve the quality of her life. If she wished to
destroy the home, by contrast, she would have to forgo this present income
from the sale of the remainder. So by forgoing a substantial amount of
current income and retaining fee simple ownership over her home, Johnston
did put her money where her mouth was.
The closer Johnston got to death, the higher the value of the remainder
interest she was forgoing and the greater her current monetary sacrifice. As
a property owner's demise approaches, the sacrifice associated with the
posthumous destruction of her property more closely approximates that
made by a property owner who is alive. Under this reasoning, Dukeminier
and Johanson's broad claim is false, and the difference between the living
and dead destroyer is a mere matter of degree. The first destroys one
hundred percent of his asset, and the second destroys, if elderly, perhaps
seventy-five percent of her asset. Both the living destroyer and the
testamentary destroyer incur costs as soon as they decide to destroy their
property.
To be sure, the testator can always change her mind and alter the
destructive provisions of her will. Because wills are revocable until death,
one might argue that writing such a provision into a will entails no
immediate sacrifice. But I believe this tempting argument should be
resisted. The testator does not know when she will die. Nor does she know
that her efforts to amend the will at a subsequent date will be effective.
They might not be, because of lack of capacity, bad legal advice, or judicial
suffers the economic consequences of her decision, plus or minus. Should a testator be permitted
to order the destruction of property at death when the economic loss is not visited upon the
testator but on others? Consider... Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co." (citations omitted)).
236. The opinion in Eyerman does not say when Johnston executed her will. Nevertheless,
one can be fairly certain that hers was not a deathbed will, because the neighbors did not
challenge Johnston's testamentary capacity. Had Johnston drafted a destructive will provision on
her deathbed, a competent lawyer certainly would have raised the capacity issue on the neighbors'
behalf.
237. See Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-7(d) (as amended in 2000) (outlining how to compute
valuations for life estates based on the life expectancy of the life tenant, the applicable interest
rate, and the market value of the property).
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error. Executing a valid will, then, necessarily creates a risk that the testator
will not be able to prevent the destruction, even if she might change her
mind in the future.238 This represents a real, immediate economic sacrifice
on the part of the testator.
A destructive will provision represents an immediate sacrifice in other
respects as well. First, a savvy testator is well advised to use an attorney to
amend a will, thereby generating legal costs for altering the status quo.
Second, the persistence of a destructive will provision deters transactional
partners who are aware of its existence. 239 Third, when a decision to destroy
property has been recorded in a will and ratified by the testator's
subsequent decision to avoid selling a future interest, the testator has
sacrificed the opportunity to trade present income in exchange for the future
interest. Although the will itself is immediately revocable, the failure to
revoke after time has passed may generate sunk costs for a testator that
could prove psychologically difficult to ignore, particularly if the most
opportune time to alienate a future interest has passed. For all these reasons,
inserting a destructive provision into a will is immediately costly.
That cost will not always suffice to deter destructive intentions, and for
some testators the cost will be trivial. A dying property owner might
liquidate future interests in order to pay for expensive medical intervention,
a private hospital room, travel costs for old friends and relatives who wish
to visit her one last time, and the like. But some wealthy individuals have
more than enough money to cover even the most lavish end-of-life
expenditures.24° In such cases, where the additional income to be gained
from a sale of future interests in one's property is essentially superfluous,
there would be a stronger case for limiting the owner's power to destroy
that which is hers. If, however, the decision to destroy property is made by
an owner who faces ordinary resource constraints or who does not
anticipate her imminent demise, the case for deferring to those wishes is
strong.
238. Executing a valid will containing a destructive provision is akin to lighting a fuse that is
connected to a bomb, where the fuse has an indeterminate length. The person who lit the fuse can
always try to extinguish the flame if he changes his mind, but there is a real chance he will be
unable to do so before the bomb explodes.
239. Suppose that A has executed a will ordering his car destroyed. IfA contracts with B, who
wishes to purchase a future interest in A's car, B is unlikely to be favorably disposed toward the
will provision. Even if the will provision is ultimately voided or trumped by the inter vivos
transfer, its existence will create legal complexity and uncertainty. A sophisticated B will either
demand that A amend his will before the contract is finalized or offer A a reduced price for the
future interest. If A insists on keeping the will provision in place, he will face an economic
sacrifice.
240. Howard Helsinger, who teaches and practices trusts and estates law, suggested to me
that some clients might value the postmortem expressive opportunities associated with property
destruction far more than they would value the stream of present income that could be garnered
from the sale of a future interest.
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More serious problems arise if an individual destroys property either
because he does not recognize the potential to obtain immediate income in
exchange for the sale of a future interest or because he underestimates the
value of a remainder interest in the property. Destruction in either case
might well make society worse off. In the former case, the owner fails to
realize that sparing the property might benefit both himself and society in
general. In the latter case, the owner might falsely believe destruction to be
the property's highest-value use.
The increasing popularity of reverse mortgages may alleviate these
informational concerns in the coming years. In recent decades, financial
institutions have begun marketing reverse mortgages to elderly property
owners who want to liquidate the remainder interests in their homes in
exchange for present income.24' A homeowner who obtains a "tenure"
reverse mortgage will receive a monthly payment from a lender.
After the borrower moves or dies, the house is sold and the loan is
repaid. The amount the borrower receives in monthly installments
during the life of the loan depends on several factors, including the
amount of equity the borrower has in the house, the interest rate on
the loan, the borrower's age and life expectancy and the projected
rate of house price appreciation.242
Yet firms marketing reverse mortgages to elderly homeowners have
encountered substantial obstacles, including consumers' unfamiliarity with
the product and unfavorable treatment of reverse mortgage income for the
purpose of determining eligibility for Supplemental Security Income and
Medicaid.243 To the extent that these obstacles can be overcome, we can
expect that property owners will gain an increasingly sophisticated
understanding of the value of remainder interests in their durable property.
In the meantime, in Section E, I propose a reverse-mortgage-inspired
solution to the problems created by unsophisticated owners.
B. State Action and Transaction Costs
Courts sometimes have suggested that the law's disfavored treatment of
testamentary destruction is appropriate because of the state's role in the
probate process. A living owner's destruction of her own property usually
241. See Christopher J. Mayer & Katerina V. Simons, Reverse Mortgages and the Liquidity
of Housing Wealth, 22 J. AM. REAL EST. & URB. ECON. ASS'N 235, 235 (1994); see also
Nandinee K. Kutty, Demographic Profiles of Elderly Homeowners in Poverty Who Can Gain
from Reverse Mortgages 7 (Apr. 1999), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=161909 (noting that
more than 32,000 reverse mortgages were sold between 1989 and 1999, including 7877 in 1998
alone).
242. Mayer& Simons, supra note 241, at 237.
243. Id. at 252.
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entails no state action or involvement, whereas the destruction of property
via will often does. As such, allowing the destruction of property via will
arguably makes the state a partner of the wasteful decedent.244 Hence, a
court might hold that the difference between inter vivos destruction and
testamentary destruction is that the state is involved only in the latter, and
the sovereign can use this involvement as an appropriate basis for asserting
an antiwaste public policy interest.
Upon reflection, the state action argument seems to be little more than a
makeweight. It merely begs the question of when the state should get
involved in a property owner's decision to destroy. The state does get
involved whenever someone tries to destroy a building (via the demolition
permit process), domestic currency (via criminal law),245 and in most
instances where an important work of visual art by a living artist is to be
destroyed (via the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990).246 It does not get
involved in the destruction of jewelry, most foreign currency, or important
artwork by old masters. The conceptual bases for these distinctions are not
obvious, and so it seems questionable to hang one's hat on state action
theory. Indeed, the probate process itself might be dealt with effectively
through private contracts and dispute resolution, and it is generally the
decedent's agent, not a state agent, who will do the actual destroying.
Nothing forces the state's involvement in the probate process, and only
transaction costs and countervailing policy concerns prevent the state's
more active role in preventing living owners from destroying their property.
So it is not clear why one should conceptualize the testator as forcing the
state's complicity in a destructive act.
Another implication of the state action argument is that the state ought
to become more vigilant in protecting against resource destruction. For
example, on a state action rationale, when two litigants both claim
ownership of a particular resource, the courts ought to make the claimants'
intended uses of the resource an important factor in the decision calculus. If
244. Cf Eyerman v. Mercantile Trust Co., 524 S.W.2d 210, 214-15 (Mo. Ct. App. 1975)
("[T]he taking of property by inheritance or will is not an absolute or natural right but one created
by the laws of the sovereign power .... [T]he state 'may foreclose the right absolutely, or it may
grant the right upon conditions precedent, which conditions, if not otherwise violative of our
Constitution, will have to be complied with before the right of descent and distribution (whether
under the law or by will) can exist.' Further, this power of the state is one of inherent sovereignty
which allows the state to 'say what becomes of the property of a person, when death forecloses his
right to control it."' (quoting State ex rel. McClintock v. Guinotte, 204 S.W. 806, 808-09 (Mo.
1918) (in banc))); In re Will of Pace, 400 N.Y.S.2d 488, 492 (Sur. Ct. 1977) ("To violate public
policy the act in question need not be something which the testator could not have done with his
own land while he was alive.... After his death... it is against public policy to permit the
decedent to confer this power upon someone else where his purpose is merely capricious.").
245. 18 U.S.C. §§ 331, 333 (2000) (criminalizing the mutilation of U.S. coins, paper money,
and national bank obligations).
246. Pub. L. No. 101-650, §§ 601-610, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. (104 Stat.) 5089, 5128-33
(codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
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Pierson wants to destroy the fox, and Post wants to donate it to the local
natural history museum for display, then the state's interest in avoiding
complicity in destruction ought to make the court more likely to award
custody of the fox to Post. By the same reasoning, it would seem that the
state ought to maintain tax policies that penalize destroyers of property. But
in fact tax rules often do not penalize destruction.247
There is a related, far more persuasive basis for distinguishing between
destruction by an owner and destruction by an executor. On this account,
the state has some interest in preventing the waste of valuable, privately
owned resources but faces monitoring and enforcement costs every time it
seeks to do so. Because the probate process already involves lawyers and
the judicial system, and because litigant-driven will contests or construction
proceedings make it relatively inexpensive for the state to monitor probated
wills to find instances of property destruction, the state can prevent
inefficient destruction without expending substantial resources. The same
may be said of the destruction of buildings by living owners, because such
destruction is ordinarily noticeable by neighbors or city inspectors.
Monitoring living owners' surreptitious destruction of artwork, on the other
hand, would be quite costly, and the costs of monitoring and enforcing
antidestruction rules would exceed the cost of allowing some private
destruction.
That said, if transaction cost minimization is the appropriate rationale
for the law's restrictions on property destruction, then the law needs to be
adjusted in several respects. For example, the government is involved in the
regulation of funeral homes and might require licensed funeral home
directors to guarantee that wedding rings and other valuable jewelry are not
buried in graves. But evidently, Meksras's common law antidestruction rule
is not enforced via funeral home regulations.248 Moreover, in those
instances where a living person publicly announces his intent to destroy a
particular piece of property, the government's monitoring costs approach
zero, and the enforcement costs might be relatively low. In all these
situations, the government's failure to intervene to prevent waste can be
second-guessed.
247. See Citizens Bank & Trust Co. v. Comm'r, 839 F.2d 1249, 1254-55 (7th Cir. 1988) ("If
you own the Mona Lisa and paint (indelibly) a mustache on it before giving the painting to your
child, with the result that its value is greatly reduced, still your gift tax will be computed at the
reduced value."); Ahmanson Found. v. United States, 674 F.2d 761, 768 (9th Cir. 1981) ("[I]f a
public figure ordered his executor to shred and bum his papers, and then to turn the ashes over to
a newspaper, the value to be counted would be the value of the ashes, rather than the papers.");
Holland v. United States, 311 F. Supp. 422 (C.D. Cal. 1970) (holding that taxpayers are allowed a
deduction against ordinary income for a loss resulting from a building demolition). But see Sykas,
supra note 33, at 926 n.144 (noting that the IRS has adopted a contrary rule in at least one
instance).
248. See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. §§ 453.1-.9 (2004); supra note 4.
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C. Publicity and Social Norms
In explaining the law's hostility toward will provisions directing the
destruction of property, scholars have noted the potential for people
affected by destruction to persuade the living owner to reconsider. Adam
Hirsch makes the argument succinctly:
Living persons face the... social repercussions of their actions;
dead persons do not. One consequence is that a testator can, if she
is so inclined, wash her hands of her dependents, without suffering
the opprobrium that a living person would bear for such behavior.
Death spares the testator from interpersonal costs.
24 9
Hirsch thus argues that a testamentary destroyer avoids having to witness
the consequences of her actions to her heirs and immunizes herself against
the social retaliation that might follow.
Posner offers a related explanation for courts' hostility to testamentary
destruction. If the destroyer is alive at the time of the destructive act,
affected neighbors or kin might be able to persuade her to alter her course.
The person who destroys her property via will, on the other hand, is no
longer susceptible to such persuasion.25° Someone who has written a
destructive provision into her will can keep her intentions secret, precluding
third parties from trying to persuade her to preserve her property. Courts
construing destructive wills have been troubled by the prospect that a
testator might have changed her mind if only she had known certain facts
not available at the time.251 Indeed, the law's suspicious treatment of
testamentary disposition is not limited to the destruction of property-in a
handful of other contexts, courts bar testators from doing via will what
those same testators could have done had they lived.252
Hirsch's and Posner's arguments are not without force. But it is hard to
establish definitively which way they cut. Assuming that testators care
about their reputations after death, we might be particularly worried when a
court refuses to honor a person's wishes at a time when she no longer can
respond. A court deciding whether to enforce a destructive will provision
249. Hirsch, supra note 33, at 72-73.
250. POSNER, supra note 150, at 558-59; see also John H. Langbein, Mandatory Rules in the
Law of Trusts, 98 Nw. U. L. REv. 1105, 1110-11 (2004) (endorsing this argument).
251. See Nat'l City Bank v. Case W. Reserve Univ., 369 N.E.2d 814, 818-19 (Ohio Ct. Com.
Pl. 1976); Capers Estate, 34 Pa. D. & C.2d 121, 129 (C.P. Allegheny County 1964).
252. See, e.g., Carolyn L. Dessin, The Troubled Relationship of Will Contracts and Spousal
Protection: Time for an Amicable Separation, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 435, 473-75 (1996)
(discussing the law of elective shares); John A. Robertson, Posthumous Reproduction, 69 IND.
L.J. 1027, 1039-45 (1994) (arguing that a state would have more leeway in regulating the
testamentary disposition of frozen sperm than in regulating a living donor's use of his sperm).
Clare Gittings discusses the long history of English law ignoring the wishes of decedents
regarding the character of their funerals. GITrINGS, supra note 42, at 86-88.
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would have to do so without the benefit of the owner's testimony regarding
her motivations. This happened in Eyerman. Such hearings are one-sided
affairs where no party advocates the decedent's expressed interests or
explains her motivations. By contrast, the possibilities for judicial error will
be lower during the homeowner's lifetime, when the destroyer and those
opposed to the destruction both have an opportunity to explain their
positions and critique each other's arguments in open court.
Even setting aside this point, the arguments set forth by Posner and
Hirsch make presumptions that are unwarranted. More precisely, both
suppose that (1) a living donor's destruction of property will be noticed by
those who would prefer that the property be preserved, (2) a living donor
who destroys property will be susceptible to persuasion or social sanctions,
and (3) heirs and other affected third parties are more likely to want to see
property preserved than destroyed. It is not clear that all three presumptions
would hold true in most of the property destruction cases where valuable
resources are at stake.
First, chattel property usually can be destroyed surreptitiously by a
living owner. There is little reason to think that owners generally will
consult third parties before electing to destroy the chattels in question.
Indeed, to the extent that living people care about their reputations after
death, directing the destruction of a chattel via will probably attracts more
attention than destroying it during life. Because posthumous chattel
destruction must be spelled out in a will, one anticipates that some testators
who believe their heirs will object to this destruction will be deterred from
putting destructive instructions in their wills. To them, surreptitious
destruction during life will be the preferred route-heirs might never learn
about what they had lost.
Second, in many instances the living owner of destroyed property will
not stick around long enough to be ostracized. Take the paradigmatic home
destruction case of Eyerman. By attempting to destroy the home via her
will, Johnston indeed escaped the social ostracism of her neighbors. But
had she destroyed the home during her lifetime, said destruction would
have required Johnston to move elsewhere, where she similarly would have
escaped her neighbors' disapproval. Because it appears that Johnston's
relatives, the would-be beneficiaries, did not object to the home's razing,253
it is not clear that she would have suffered serious social repercussions in
the wake of the destruction. Presumably, the only opportunities for norm
enforcement would have occurred during the window of time necessary to
obtain a demolition permit. Further, it seems plausible that someone who
destroys her habitable home is the type of nonconformist who is generally
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
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immune to peer pressure from neighbors.254 Even close-knit communities
contain deviants, whose imperviousness to reputational sanctions threatens
the efficacy of informal mechanisms for social control.255
Third, there are important cases where heirs and other third parties may
prefer to see a testator's valuable property destroyed and where
disregarding owners' testamentary wishes can result in increased
destruction and social waste. Here I am thinking about transplantable
organs, a type of property that has figured prominently in this Article. As
Part II suggested, the law surely plays a role in discouraging organ
donation, but that law appears at least somewhat responsive to existing
norms. Effective organ transplantation is a relatively recent phenomenon,
and inefficient social and religious norms characterizing the removal of
organs as bodily desecration have not been displaced completely.
Now recall Hirsch's discussion of norms and consider two alternative
regimes. In Regime One, the would-be donor must disclose to his heirs
apparent his intentions to donate his organs upon his death in order for that
choice to be effective. In Regime Two, he may opt to donate his organs
secretly, for example, by filling out a form to be placed in his medical
records. If the relatives are more resistant than the would-be donor to organ
donation, then a disclosure requirement will result in added waste, because
it will give them an opportunity to dissuade the would-be donor from his
intended course of action. A would-be donor who thought his donation
would be socially beneficial might be surprised to learn that his donation
would compound his next of kin's grief. Those heirs who would have felt
uncomfortable trumping the deceased's wishes to donate will feel much
more comfortable destroying the organs if they can persuade their loved
one to change his mind during life.
In sum, the supposition that Hirsch and Posner both make-that heirs
and other third parties are likely to dissuade owners from destroying their
property-may be incorrect in the context of transplantable organs.25 6 It
appears that peer pressure, persuasion, and socialization operate to increase
the destruction of these enormously valuable organs. For this reason,
deference to the secretive testamentary wishes of a decedent may well
result in less waste than a regime that only respects the wishes of a decedent
that were articulated to his kin prior to his death.
254. See supra note 58.
255. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES 56-59 (1991).
256. Their supposition may be incorrect for other resources as well. A testator might tell his
spouse that he intends to pass on his wedding ring to her after he dies. It is not difficult to imagine
a scenario whereby she tells him that she does not want it and would prefer that he "keep it" for an
eventual reunion in the afterlife.
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D. Testamentary Capacity
Having assumed a sane and rational testator during this discussion, it is
worth exploring what happens when that assumption is relaxed. Certainly
the law is justified in disregarding the wishes of an insane testator,
regardless of the contents of those wishes.257 When an owner of a valuable
resource who is genuinely incapable of making rational decisions destroys
the resource, no one benefits. In such circumstances, the state is plainly
justified in intervening to protect the welfare of the owner and society as a
whole. As long as the costs of evaluating the owner's decisionmaking
capacity do not dwarf the value of the affected resources, the law ought to
bar destruction.258
The interesting legal questions arise in the closer cases, where a
testator's lack of capacity is disputed. Evidence that the testator destroyed
or tried to destroy her own property is sometimes introduced to show that
she lacked testamentary capacity. 259 At least one (Canadian) court has been
unreceptive to these kinds of arguments in the destruction context,
preferring a waste or externality rationale for refusing to follow the
testator's wishes.260 Thoughtful scholars already have argued that the text of
idiosyncratic will provisions should be admissible, but by no means
decisive, in determining whether the testator was of sound mind.26' In the
destruction context, however, there is a particular danger that eccentricity
will be mistaken for insanity. People who wish to destroy their homes or
paintings via will are outliers, to be sure, but their unusual behavior may
stem from the types of unorthodox expressive interests that, in other
contexts, the law goes to great lengths to protect.
E. A Sui Generis Solution: A Safe Harbor for Testamentary Destroyers
Recall the recently covered terrain. Some people in society wish to use
particular property during their lifetimes and then direct the property's
destruction upon their deaths. These preferences are sincere much of the
257. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: WILLS & OTHER DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 8.1
(2003). Under the Restatement, such instructions are voidable. For a recent interdisciplinary
examination, see Daniel C. Marson et al., Testamentary Capacity and Undue Influence in the
Elderly: A Jurisprudent Therapy Perspective, 28 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 71 (2004).
258. There is, of course, a related question about whether the expressive benefits of property
destruction "count" if the destroyer is insane. For an exploration of this issue under First
Amendment law, see Bruce J. Winick, The Right to Refuse Mental Health Treatment: A First
Amendment Perspective, 44 U. MiAMi L. REV. 1, 41-58 (1989).
259. See, e.g., In re Ellis' Estate, 210 P.2d 417, 424 (Kan. 1949).
260. See, e.g., In re Wishart, [1992] N.B.R.2d 397, 404, 419-20 (Can.).
261. See Hirsch, supra note 33, at 80-83; see also Langbein, supra note 250, at 1110 n.31 ("It
is true that an owner with capacity to conduct his own affairs may destroy his Rembrandt, but
destroying Rembrandts would be likely to cause capacity to be questioned.").
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time, and savvy testators will expend resources trying to circumvent legal
rules that prohibit posthumous destruction. In some of these cases-
especially those involving wedding rings-it seems that, because living
people care about what happens to their bodies after their deaths, the
would-be destroyers really are the resources' highest-value users.
Perversely, well-informed testators sometimes destroy property prematurely
because they recognize that death will deprive them of the opportunity to
destroy it altogether. Limiting posthumous destruction therefore imposes
substantial costs on society.
Yet persistent concerns that the dead have "nothing to lose" by
destroying property make courts reluctant to permit testamentary
destruction. To be sure, a sophisticated living testator demonstrates her
seriousness of purpose by forgoing the present income that could result
from the sale of a future interest in the property. At the same time, some
people may destroy their property because they do not realize that they have
the opportunity to retain a life interest in it and sell the remainder for
present cash, or because they underestimate the amount of money that a
remainder interest will fetch.
Further, destroying valuable property sometimes runs afoul of prevalent
social norms in the United States, with wedding rings and organs forming
important exceptions. These norms may check individuals' destructive
impulses in life but are ineffective once the would-be destroyer has died.
Thus, the law might allow destruction by the living, while restricting
destruction by the dead, as a means of ensuring that owners are willing to
suffer the reputational sanctions that would accompany destruction.
Finally, some percentage of those who attempt to destroy property are
incapable of making rational judgments. In such circumstances paternalistic
restrictions on their ability to destroy property generally promote testators'
best interests and social welfare.
In short, there are some instances where respecting destructive will
provisions is welfare enhancing and other instances where it is not. Is the
appropriate legal response a strict antidestruction rule? Hardly. An owner's
exercise of any property right-the right to exclude, the right to mortgage,
or the right to sell-can diminish social welfare in certain circumstances.
But the law does not respond to this possibility by eliminating the property
right in question. Rather, the law recognizes the persistence of the right but
imposes limitations on how it can be exercised.262 This raises the following
question: Is there a legal rule that can help courts distinguish between the
types of posthumous destruction that ought to be permitted and those that
ought to be prohibited? Namely, we want a rule that addresses our concerns
262. See, e.g., State v. Shack, 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971) (limiting exercises of a landowner's
right to exclude legal aid and health care workers from his land, based on constitutional
considerations and the welfare of the migrant workers who worked and lived on the property).
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about testators underestimating the value of the future interest in property
slated for destruction, testators using the will process to dodge efforts to
persuade them to preserve valuable property, would-be owners never
learning about the existence of property until after it has been destroyed,
and testators lacking testamentary capacity.
Property law can respond to all these concerns through a rather simple
requirement: Destructive instructions contained in wills shall be honored
only if the owner, during his lifetime, notified the public of the opportunity
to purchase a future interest in the property. For example, a testator
interested in destroying his home could be required to market a future
interest in the property through an auction service. The advertisement for
the future interest would have to list detailed information about both the
property in question and the life tenant himself.263 The testator would
establish a minimum reserve price, which could be kept secret by the
testator. If the owner's reserve price was exceeded by a bidder or the
government decided to condemn the future interest, then the property would
be spared from destruction. But if no bid exceeded the would-be destroyer's
minimum asking price, and he was unwilling to sell his property to the
highest bidder, then the owner would have demonstrated that he valued
destruction of the property more than anyone else valued its preservation.
Turning down the highest bid for a future interest would give owners safe
harbor to destroy their property via will.
Note that this policy lever addresses all the concerns that have
prompted the divergent legal treatment of testamentary and inter vivos
destruction. From a welfarist perspective, where the owner of property has
forgone a market price for the property's future interest, he has earned the
ight to consume that future interest by destroying the property.2 4
Moreover, the policy would substantially lower the transaction costs
associated with monitoring living people's decisions to destroy property.
Marketing future interests in the property would alert community members
263. A buyer would want access to information that helps establish the life tenant's life
expectancy, such as age, gender, and health.
264. Sometimes high transaction costs create a false impression that the owner of property,
who wishes to destroy it, is the resource's highest-value user. Situations surely exist where a large
number of people derive substantial "existence value" from knowing that a particular piece of
property survives, and these people would be willing to pay some amount to ensure the property's
preservation, but the highest bidder at an auction nevertheless wishes to destroy it. If the aggregate
willingness to pay of the preservationist bidders exceeds the aggregate willingness to pay of any
destructive bidders, then we can say that transaction costs will result in the socially wasteful
destruction of property. This seems like a plausible account for the destruction of the Buddhas of
Bamiyan, discussed supra text accompanying notes 180-181. For a discussion of existence value,
see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences
Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1117-18 (2000). There ought to be cases where the
reverse is true-i.e., where a large number of people would derive substantial "nonexistence
value" from knowing that a particular piece of property had been destroyed. The destruction of the
"cursed" Steve Bartman baseball and the destruction of a yacht purported to belong to Adolf
Hitler seem like good examples of this. See supra text accompanying notes 5, 171.
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and heirs apparent to the owner's intentions while they were still in a
position to influence him to change his mind.
A major advantage of this approach is that it would facilitate the
condemnation of property that might benefit the community more
generally. By acquiring a future interest, the government would be paying
less than the full market value for the property in fee simple, while
simultaneously ensuring that the property would be spared from
destruction.265 Posthumous condemnation in right-to-destroy cases
necessarily thwarts the wishes of the testator without conferring any
meaningful benefit on him. 266 Condemnation during the testator's lifetime
thwarts his wishes too, but it at least provides him with money that he can
enjoy during the rest of his life.
Finally, the process of marketing a future interest in anticipation of
one's death would require that the testator have some sophistication and a
capacity to plan for the future. One imagines, therefore, that those lacking
testamentary capacity rarely would be able to jump through the appropriate
hoops. And while legal counsel can be expected to facilitate this process,
the decision to consult counsel regarding such intentions seems,
independently, to offer some evidence of the testator's capacity. Moreover,
to the extent that dementia or other limitations on capacity become
increasingly probable as the testator's life nears its end, requiring the
testator to market the future interest at some earlier date increases the
likelihood that destructive decisions would be authorized by people still
possessed of their senses.
For all these reasons, the law should harmonize its treatment of inter
vivos and posthumous destruction in cases where the posthumous destroyer
has marketed the future interest in the property and elected to forgo the full
market value of this future interest. Such a rule will make all testamentary
destroyers behave like sophisticated market actors and enable them to
weigh the costs and benefits of property destruction.
This discussion raises the inevitable question of whether the same
regime should apply to transplantable organs. I have, in the past, expressed
reservations about the wisdom of permitting market transactions in human
267organs. Without getting into the contentious issue of whether it would be
265. These cases are all instances in which the owner wishes to continue using the property
during his lifetime, so there is little risk that it would get destroyed while in the testator's
possession. After all, if the testator had wanted to destroy the property prior to his own demise, he
could have done so. In any event, even if the testator changed his mind and sought immediate
destruction following condemnation, the doctrine of waste would prevent him from doing so.
266. The testator's estate receives the market value of the property that the state condemned.
But the testator is dead, so the heirs are the sole beneficiaries of these proceeds. If the testator had
wanted the heirs to receive this money, he would not have directed his executor to destroy the
property at issue.
267. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms:
Commodifying California's Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1293-96 (2000).
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desirable to create a lawful market for organs, I will simply explore two
possibly appealing aspects of this policy innovation in the organ donation
context. First, permitting a living donor to sell the right to harvest his
kidneys upon his death is far less troubling than permitting a living donor to
sell his kidney, effective immediately.268 Second, to the extent that many
people are inclined to donate but do not do so because they are unaware of
the need for organs or underestimate their worth, the process of marketing a
future interest in one's organs might solve both problems. So a law that
permitted people to destroy their organs only if they had forgone the highest
market price for a future interest might serve an educational function for
potential donors and their heirs. It also could help society differentiate
between those who sincerely want their cadavers to remain intact and those
whose preferences are weak or driven by the default rule.
My proposed safe harbor rule lacks obvious analogs to existing
doctrines in property law. Given the lack of analogs and the arguable need
for regulation in the area of future interest sales, 269 legislative action may be
the most natural avenue for reform. That said, a trusts and estates lawyer
whose client wishes to destroy valuable property via will would be wise to
advise the client to market the future interest in his property during his
lifetime. Doing so would address every objection that courts have lodged
against testamentary destruction. A common law court then would be in the
position to hold that marketing a future interest prior to death is one way
(but perhaps not the only way) for a sincerely destructive testator to
convince a court to respect his wishes.
CONCLUSION
The recent trend in American law has been to curtail property owners'
traditional rights to destroy their own property. Given Joseph Sax's
advocacy for a hastening of that trend, it makes sense to review the law
regarding property destruction and evaluate whether limiting owners' right
to destroy is socially beneficial.
Those who wish to curtail the right to destroy base their argument
almost exclusively on the resource waste that results from property
destruction. Usable resources may be squandered; neighborhoods may
268. See Lloyd R. Cohen, Increasing the Supply of Transplant Organs: The Virtues of a
Futures Market, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1 (1989); Hansmann, supra note 93, at 62-78.
269. The law would need to create rules that could distinguish between good faith marketing
of a future interest (e.g., selling it through a reputable auction house) and sham marketing of a
future interest (e.g., posting a vague flyer in an obscure location for one hour). Practical
difficulties would arise in the case of unpublished writings or other art that the author would like
to destroy. The law should require that the author's name be marketed, perhaps along with a very
broad description of the work's contents, but the author should not have to make the contents of
the work available to potential bidders. All of these practical issues seem most readily
surmountable by legislators or administrators.
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empty; and historians may have more difficulty studying artistic, political,
or cultural traditions. These are all substantial concerns. But as I have
argued, prohibiting people from destroying their property can result in
waste too. Historic preservation laws can lock inefficient land uses into
place. Rules barring patent suppression can discourage firms from investing
in innovations. Rules requiring presidents to preserve all presidential papers
can deter them from memorializing controversial or sensitive ideas.
Particularly in cases involving high transaction costs, widely held
prodestruction norms, or substantial adverse ex ante effects, the cure of
preventing destruction is worse than the disease of allowing it.
The Article then uses the destruction of internal organs as a starting
point for an examination of the expressive benefits associated with
destruction. Rational people usually do not destroy valuable property
intentionally. So where the government witnesses a rational person
destroying her valuable property, it should presume that the destructive act
furthers expressive objectives. This deferential approach still raises the
question of whether expressive interests should trump the usual concerns
about wasted resources and associated negative externalities.
Cases that require courts to balance expressive interests against
substantial economic or social welfare interests may become very difficult.
Courts have an unfortunate tendency to try to make them easier by
disregarding the interests on one side of the equation. For example, cases
involving the destruction of frozen embryos ignore the interests of infertile
couples who would like to have the embryos preserved for implantation.
Indeed, in these cases, courts give no thought to the ordinary critiques of
property destruction. Similarly, courts generally disregard artists'
substantial First Amendment interests in ensuring that incomplete, inferior,
or otherwise disfavored unpublished works in their collections are
destroyed upon their passing. That attitude is disturbing. Sane artists should
decide which of their works are presented to the world-they have the
correct economic incentives and greater familiarity with their own work
than anyone else. Disregarding an unambiguous destruction provision in a
will raises the specter of compelled speech. Moreover, an antidestruction
rule creates perverse incentives for ailing artists to destroy works that they
might not be able to finish during their lives and to avoid committing high-
risk thoughts to paper until they have fully conceptualized the entire
project.
Congressional legislation on the destruction of visual art provides a
more balanced and sophisticated approach to destruction cases where
important interests exist on both sides. Under a collectivist reading of
VARA, the law privileges the creation of art over the destruction of art,
while recognizing that both creative and destructive acts have expressive
value. After the artist who created a work has displayed it publicly for a
substantial period of time or contracted away his rights to prevent
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destruction, his expressive interests fade, and the interests of the owner who
wishes to destroy a work to criticize its content or capture the public's
attention must prevail. Hence, the law's protection of important new works
by living artists and its lack of protection of works by old masters constitute
puzzling economic regulation but sensible free speech law.
The conflict between individual autonomy and collectivist orientations
is a recurring trope in any discussion of property destruction. The law of
property, and any intelligible theory of destruction, necessarily flirt with
both conceptions. The relative simplicity of engaging in autonomy-oriented
analysis helps explain what may be perceived as this Article's tilt toward an
individual autonomy perspective on the right to destroy. Property and
speech collectivists have yet to confront the tremendous uncertainty
explored in this Article. There is empirical uncertainty surrounding the
circumstances under which antidestruction rules result in a net increase in
the quantity of property that is worth preserving. The individual liberty
issues involved seem easier to understand and, for the time being, may
provide a more appropriate basis for policy formulations.
Finally, the law's attitude toward dead hand property destruction is
overly restrictive and creates perverse incentives for sincere testators who
care about what happens to their property after their deaths. Courts have
continued to give living owners some leeway in destroying their property,
while ordering executors to disregard destructive instructions contained in
wills. The stated bases for this hostility to posthumous destruction are the
ideas that only a living owner will suffer the consequences of her act and
that self-interest will deter most living owners from destroying valuable
resources. On this account, the courts can disregard destructive will
provisions because the testator never "put her money where her mouth
was." I argue that this account is incorrect. The testator's refusal to sell a
future interest in the destroyed property during her life demonstrates her
willingness to forgo present income to secure the property's destruction. If
testators are fully informed and rational, they have the proper incentives to
avoid destroying valuable property capriciously. To that end, I propose a
legal regime whereby testators would be privileged to destroy
nonlandmarked property if they marketed a future interest in the property
and turned down the highest price offered for that future interest. The only
exception to this rule would arise in situations where the government
elected to exercise its condemnation authority. In cases involving wedding
rings, family heirlooms, personal papers, and sometimes even homes,
individuals seem to gain substantial utility from knowing that "they can
take it with them" upon their passing. As long as the government can be
assured of their sincerity, testamentary capacity, and recognition of the
property's beneficial postmortem uses, it ought not prevent these people
from directing the destruction of their property via will.
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